

AN ANALYSIS OF ROK-US MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONSHIP
FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE PRESENT

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A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Korean Conflict. 2) What changes have altered the requirements of the command structure. 3) What changes should be made in the ROK/US/UN command structure to make it militarily more efficient and politically more acceptable to the ROK.

→ Analysis reveals that the current politically complex ROK-US military command arrangement is not designed to wage war. The inconsistency between the peace-keeping mission of the UNC and the warfighting task of the CFC seems to pose added problems for the effective combined operations of allies. No single US unit is assigned to CFC, while most combat units of ROK forces are assigned to CFC. The ROK JCS exercises only OPCON over ROK units for counter-infiltration operations. The Chief of Staff of each service exercises command less OPCON. A single US senior officer has an overwhelming power. The fact that the US, as a foreign power, speaks for the entire southern side on the Military Armistice Commission while North Korea represents the north constitutes a further embarrassment and political humiliation for the ROK. The ROK Armed Forces has outgrown the ROK/US military relationship created by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953.

→ Therefore, a more desirable proposal for the ROK/US military command arrangement is as follows: 1) Eliminate the inequity in the ROK/US military command relationship by reevaluating and redefining the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. It should reflect a command structure to which both countries will make forces available if North Korea attacks. 2) Return OPCON of ROK forces to the ROK National Command Authority. 3) Both countries need to work out a mutually acceptable rotation for primary command positions. 4) Disband the UNC HQ. Korea has outgrown it. 5) A bilateral agreement between South and North Korea must be negotiated to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement. After the UNC and Military Armistice Commission should disappear.

✓
Recommendation →

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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF ROK-US MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONSHIP FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE PRESENT

By LTC CHUNG, Kyung Young, ROK Army, 130 pages.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of the Korean-American military command relationship from the historical perspective with the object of setting forth a proposal for a new structure based on a consultative relationship, rather than command.

The study focuses on the following questions: 1) What factors led to the original structure of the ROK/US/UN command relationship at the time of the Korean War, 2) What changes have altered the requirements of the command structure, and 3) What changes should be made in the ROK/US/UN command structure to make it militarily more efficient and politically more acceptable to the ROK?

Analysis reveals that the current politically complex ROK-US military command arrangement is not designed to wage war. The inconsistency between the peacekeeping mission of the UNC and the warfighting task of the CFC seems to pose added problems for the effective combined operations of allies. No single US unit is assigned to the operational control (OPCON) of CFC in peacetime, while most combat units of ROK forces are assigned to CFC. The ROK JCS exercises only OPCON ROK units for counter-infiltration operations. The ROK Chief of Staff of each service exercise command less OPCON. A single US senior officer has an overwhelming power. The fact that the US, as a foreign power, speaks for the entire southern side on the Military Armistice Commission while North Korea represents the North constitutes a further embarrassment and political humiliation for the ROK. The ROK Armed Forces has outgrown the ROK-US military relationship created by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953.

Therefore, a more desirable proposal for the ROK-US military command arrangement is as follows: 1) Eliminate the inequity in the ROK-US military command relationship by reevaluating and redefining the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. It should reflect a command structure to which both countries will make forces available if North Korea attacks. 2) Return OPCON of ROK forces to the ROK National Command Authority. 3) Both countries need to work out a mutually acceptable rotation for primary command positions. 4) Disband the UNC HQ. Korea has outgrown it. 5) A bilateral agreement between South and North Korea must be negotiated to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement. After this, the UNC and the military Armistice Commission should disappear.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to analyze the evolution of the Korean-American military command arrangements from the Korean War through the Seoul Olympic Games with the object of setting forth a proposal for a new structure based on a relationship of consultation, rather than command.

The fundamental issues of the US military presence in Korea include: US operational control (OPCON) over the ROK forces, the movement of the Eighth Army HQ base, and the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. These interallied relationship and the assumptions upon which they rest were taboo from the 1950's to the mid-1980's. Though now publicly addressed they are still sensitive and easily raise deep emotion. Changes in this relationship must be built on a rational appraisal of alliance requirements.

In view of these developments, this paper examines the ROK/US military relationship within the political, economic, military framework of the Korean Peninsula. In this connection, the paper assumes that US forces in Korea

will not be withdrawn in the near future. Not surprisingly, this assumption raises important questions which provide the structural basis for the analysis: 1) What factors led to the original structure of the ROK/US/UN command relationship at the time of the Korean War, 2) What changes have altered the requirements of the command structure, 3) What changes should be made in the ROK/US/UN command structure to make it militarily more efficient and politically more acceptable to ROK?

An examination of the military and political implications of the ROK-US command relation is long overdue. until recently, little primary and secondary material and data has been available. Few historical works directly address these military command relationships. Furthermore, the concept of "command relationship" has changed continuously over the years since the term "command relationship" first appeared officially in ROK President Syngman Rhee's letter to General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command on July 14, 1950. The letter assigns "command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the ROK during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally (MacArthur) or by such

military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate to the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas... ". (1) It is obvious from President Rhee's letter that he had no understanding of the important differences between the terms "command authority" and "operational control". In relinquishing command of ROK forces to General MacArthur, he relinquished, to a significant degree, the sovereignty of the Korean nation. In this sense, his action was unauthorized by the Korean people, and therefore, beyond his legal authority.

Command authority over the Korean Armed Forces resides today, irrevocably with the ROK government. The Commander-in-Chief, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC), exercises operational control limited to the execution of combined operations taken to defeat all external attacks on the ROK. That is, command authority is the general right to issue orders necessary to manage the military, while operational control is a restricted right exercised only during military operations against external enemies. While the CINCCFC enjoys operational control he should not possess command authority. Military officials and academic experts point out, however, that these distinctions are not universally understood. The term

command authority has been erroneously used for operational control, and the ROK-US combined military operations structure has been a growing source of friction in Korean-American relations.

From the inception of the ROK/US alliance, there has developed a widespread reluctance on the part of ROK/US military and political leaders to publicly associate themselves with the uncomfortable command structure. This reluctance has resulted in what amounts to an unwritten and unspoken agreement between ROK/US military and political leaders to allow US military operational control to insure that the issue of command control never be publicly raised. However, this attitude did not consider the possibility that Korea's emergence as a modern industrial power would bring the inequity of this arrangement into sharp relief. That time arrived in 1986.

Since the Korean War, ROK field forces have been under the operational control of an American general. This arrangement was enormously useful during the Korean War for it ensured the unity of command, one of the cardinal principles of war. But what made great sense in 1950 is not required forty years later. What had been a strength then,

is now increasingly seen by the Korean people as a liability. Accordingly, reform of the command relationship has become a key focus of ROK political and military leaders. The lessons learned from past ROK/US military command relationship constitute the foundation for a coherent reform program. Frank analysis and resolution of ROK/US planning and operations issues must be the objective of any reform-oriented study.

Acknowledging that changes in the military command relationship are inevitable, both nations should strive to develop the command relationship without altering deterrence, because the threat of North Korean aggression remains a real and present threat.

The US forty year experience in Korea is significant. US security support and economic assistance enabled the ROK to advance into the upper ranks of industrializing countries and maintain peace in Korea and stability in Northeast Asia. In the meantime, the emergence of the Republic as a major player on the international scene and amazing economic and political development have changed the fundamental requirements for US military presence in Korea. (2) We can easily identify evidence that the "client-patron"

relationship that so long characterized ROK/US relations no longer is appropriate. We can also vividly confirm the Korean self-determination and national will to resolve their own national issues including reunification negotiations with North Korea. The Korean people are now exhibiting greater national self-confidence, and consider themselves in all respects equal partners in bilateral and multinational areas. This paper will attempt to amplify in detail some of these historic problems, while at the same time proposing some possible solutions. Additionally this paper will develop a model of future ROK/US military command relationship which may be considered by ROK/US planners.

Chapter 2 covers the pertinent literature used in the development of this study. Chapter 3 deals with the evolution of the ROK/US vertical military command relationships from the initial stage of the ROK/US military command relationship prior to the establishment of ROK/US Combined Forces Command in 1978. Chapter 4 discusses how the vertical command relationship has evolved into a horizontal relationship. Chapter 5 examines how the changes created by the recent ROK/US political leadership shift, economic development and the 1988 Seoul Olympics have effected the ROK/US military command relationship.

Endnotes

1. Finley, James P. The Experience in Korea, 1971-1982: In the Vanguard of ROK-US Relations, (Seoul: Command Historian Office, HQ. USFK/EUSA, 1983), P. 59.
President Syngman Rhee's Letter to General MacArthur on July 14, 1950.

"In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas,

The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have joined together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land."

2. Lae Hyock Sup, Korean Perception of ROK-US Military Alliance (Honolulu, Hawaii: The 4th Annual Conference of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, Nov. 15-18, 1988), p. 3.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Sources of literature for this study consist primarily of published secondary sources, accessible official primary sources, and periodical literature. Each will be discussed separately.

Published works on the US military government in Korea, the establishment of the Republic of Korean Armed Forces, the Korean War or Korean Conflict abound and were primarily useful in dealing with the ROK/US military relationships. References to ROK/US military command relations were few but highly valuable. A Short History of ROK Armed Forces (1948-1983) produced by the Ministry of National Defense, and Republic of Korea and the US Military Experience in Korea (1881-1982) published by History Office, United States Forces Korea/the Eighth United States Army were the best sources of detailed data on the topic. The topics were extremely narrow and the research very detailed. The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the Korean National Defense College Library in Seoul contain a large number of these studies on ROK/US military relationships. Official documents dealing directly with ROK/US military command relationships

by the UNC and CFC were very few.

Primary source references filled these gaps adequately. Interviews with former CINCs, CFC and experienced soldiers assigned to the Republic of Korea were of great assistance in developing this thesis. They also were very helpful in providing secondary sources unavailable in CARL.

While published books solely addressing the ROK/US military command relationship in Korea, are very limited, a small number of key books address the subject and were a major source of primary material listings. Among the best are The JCS and US Policy and Strategy Regarding Korea 1945-1953 by Ohn Chang IL, Impact of US Forces in Korea by Lee Suk Bok, US-ROK Combined Operations, a Korean Perspective by Lee Taek Hyung. Recent articles appeared at seminars, in journals, and in newspapers are informative. They include the Fourth Annual Conference of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii in November 1988.

An even larger number of works address ROK/US military relationship. Among the most valuable works are Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War published by the office of the Chief of Military History, Policy and Direction: The First Year by James Schnabel.

The Korean Decision by Glen D. Paige, The Korean War by General Mathew B. Ridgeway, A Study of the United States Policies in the United Nations by Leland M. Goodrick. All contain first hand accounts of the events from a US viewpoint. Less well-known but extremely well written foreign policy histories of US-Korean relations were The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, (1941-1950) by James Irving Matrey and US-Korea Relations (1881-1982) edited by Kwak Tae Hwan. The Korean War by Kim Jom Gon provides a different viewpoint as a Korean General officer in the Korean War. On Strategy: the Vietnam War in Content by Harry G. Summers awakens readers to a valuable perspective of the Korean War. His comparison and contrast of the command structures of the Korean and Vietnam Wars provides unique insights into the capabilities and shortfalls of each.

Periodical literature in the U.S. and Korea reflect their respective peoples' impressions about events in Korea and the United States. Magazines including Time, Newsweek, the Far East Economic Review, the Korean Review, Asian Defense Journal, Shindongah, Wolkan Chosun, and Wolkan Jounghang attempt to provide on-the-spot reports. A common characteristic among all these publications recently is the general inaccuracy and bias these articles display. Regularly, mass media, including TV, have tended to

exaggerate the student protest situation in Korea in an effort conscious or unconscious to create anti-American sentiment in their readers or viewers. For example, The Wall Street Journal recently reported "... American GIs (are now) wondering whether they are here to protect South Korea from invasion by North Koreans or themselves from attacks by South Koreans ... ".(1) In speaking for all American GIs, this reporter has assumed a position for which it is doubtful he has actually done the necessary polling. It appears that both US and Korean media have stated facts about incidents and then used those facts to draw conclusions which cannot empirically be verified, but nonetheless sell their product.

Endnote

1. McGurn, William, Anti-Americanism Heads South of the Korean Divide (The Wall Street Journal, Nov 30, 1988)

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGINS OF KOREAN-AMERICAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND THE ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURE

PRE-KOREAN WAR ISSUES

This chapter examines the creation of ROK-US military relationship in Korea. It also analyzes how the US military government in Korea released operational control of the ROK Armed Forces to the ROK Government during the period from the liberation of Korea following the end of World War II to the establishment of the Republic of Korea Government. It covers the evolution of US policy towards Korea and discusses its application in Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1950. It discusses what factors led to the structure of ROK/US/UN command relationship at the time of the Korean War. In addition, this chapter also examines the evolution of the ROK-US military relationship symbolizing a vertical relationship prior to the creation of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command.

Anxious to establish a credible American presence prior to the arrival of Russian occupation forces, the first landing of the US forces in Korea occurred in September,

1945, four weeks after the Russian declaration of war. The hasty deployment caused American forces to arrive ill-prepared to assume occupation duties. The division of the Korean peninsula had never been seriously considered before the Russian move forced the decision, at around midnight, August 10, 1945. Koreans had no chance to express their desires during the decision-making process. Their fate was decided for them, despite the existence of the Provisional Government of Korea in Exile. To understand the ROK-US military relationship it is necessary to examine the historical background.

The absence of tangible US interests in Korea was responsible for US indifference toward Korea prior to US involvement in the Pacific War in December 1941. (1) There had been no reason for the United States to be interested in Korea, because Korea was seen as province of Japan. According to the Kastura-Taft secret agreement in 1905, the United States acquiesced to the fact that Korea was a part of the Japanese empire, once the Japanese promised not to infringe upon American interests in other areas, especially in the Philippines.

After the Pacific War broke out as a result of Japanese aggression, Korea, in American eyes became one of several territories "stolen" by the Japanese. The United

States regarded Korea as a victim of Japanese imperialism that should be free and independent. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 confirmed this position, without any commitment to Korea's future. Still, allied unity to defeat Japan was considered far more important than any political discussion about Korea. During this period, US policy makers perceived no "Korean problem."

In light of Japanese resistance in the Pacific, US officials overestimated the strength of the Japanese Kwangtung Army in Manchuria. US Secretary of War Henry Stimson suggested that the fighting might not end until the latter part of 1946, and that such operations might cost over a million American casualties. The American military planned an invasion of the Japanese homeland and only after the homeland was secured would turn their attention to Korea. The record at Potsdam clearly shows the unanimity of American military planners on the need for the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

Russian entry into the war against Japan on August 8, 1945 and the signs of the imminent collapse of Japan forced the US government to do something about Korea. The result was a division of the Korean peninsula. The division was decided casually and hurriedly, then confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and finally by President Harry S.

Truman and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. (2)

The 38th Parallel, as a dividing line in Korea had never been the subject of international discussion among the wartime leaders. The parallel, which was destined to be so tragic in later years, was neither debated nor bargained for by either the United States or the Soviet Union. As Dean Rusk, an eyewitness to the birth of the situation at the 38th Parallel, stated, it was intended to be a temporary military demarcation to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea. (3) The US proposed to limit Soviet occupation to approximately half of Korea. The fatal fallacy of this proposal lies in the fact that the desire of the Korean people for independence was ignored by the US and the Soviet Union. Even though the desire for Soviet aid in the Pacific War was understandable, US policy makers, in requesting the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan, failed to predict accurately the Soviet Pacific area policy goals following the Japanese surrender.

International trusteeship was the first American proposal for dealing with Korea. It recommended a four nations trusteeship including the US, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China for five years. Faced with vehement opposition from Koreans, the US abandoned the idea of Korean trusteeship as unworkable. Though the US-Soviet

Joint Commission reconvened in May 1947 to resolve the unification issues, the meeting deadlocked due to the Soviet intransigence. Consequently, the United Nations was almost the only remaining means through which the US could negotiate with the Soviet Union concerning the issue of unification. In an attempt to break a total impasse over Korean unification, the US presented the Korean issue to the United Nations, calling for the establishment of a united Korean government.

Thus, under sponsorship of the United States, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution on November 16, 1947, calling for elections throughout Korea under the supervision of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea. The Soviet military government, however, denied the UN Commission permission to enter its zone. As a result, the Republic of Korea was organized on August 15, 1948, under the auspice of the United Nations Commission. The Soviet military government, defying the United Nations, established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 9, 1948 in the north. In this way, two separate governments within one nation resulted from power politics rather than the will of the Korean people.

After Lt. General John R. Hodge, Commander, US forces in Korea, accepted the surrender of Japanese forces south of

the 38th Parallel, Far East Command (FECOM) General Order 1 was issued. It stated that acts of resistance to the occupying forces or army acts within which might disturb public peace and safety would be punished severely. General Hodge temporarily retained the Japanese Governor-General and the Japanese officials in their positions to arrange a smooth transition from Japanese rule to that of the US military government. (4) General Hodge's announcement understandably infuriated the Koreans.

Many Koreans still do not understand why the US authorities refused to recognize and utilize the Exiled Provisional Government of Korea that was located in China. This provisional government had been the center of independent activity through the heart of Japanese colonial rule since 1919. Supported by Koreans, it was a functional organization dealing with various independent activities and most Koreans respected the organization and its president, Kim Koo. The neglect of this organization was one of the fatal mistakes in the process of establishing a Republic of Korea. The exclusion of the Provisional Government actually jeopardized credibility and legitimacy with the Korean people of any new South Korean government that would be forthcoming.

Especially in the course of establishing the Korean

military constabulary, the framework of ROK Armed Forces, the absence of the former resistance army in the constabulary officer group and the preference for Korean officers who had served in the Japanese armed forces was contrary to the long military tradition of Korea, and significantly eroded its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of Korean people. The Korean Restoration Army was under the Provisional Government of Korea in Exile. They had already completed hard training with the assistance of US Army. The army consisted of warriors from Manchuria, who had fought against the Japanese since 1910, and Korean soldiers who escaped from the Japanese Army to join their own army. Moreover, the lack of the spirit of the national identity negatively affected the leadership of the officer corps. This effect remained in the ROK armed forces for a long time. How could officers from an aggressor enemy nation even though they were Koreans, become the proud bulwark of the new nation? US acceptance of this illegitimate officer corps enfeebled the new army and created a serious leadership problem.

Meanwhile, in the course of establishing the Korean armed forces, the US government adopted some temporary measures. General MacArthur and General Hodge requested creation of a Korean national civil police of 25,000 by January 1, 1946, assuming that it would become the nucleus

of Korean Defense Forces. The US JCS considered that the establishment of South Korean armed forces was desirable for numerous reasons: it would probably keep the United States out of a Korean Civil War; it might prevent a Korean Civil War; it would permit an orderly withdrawal of US forces from Korea; and, it would aid in maintaining US prestige in the Far East.

COL Lee Ung-Joon, an ex-Japanese Army member, got deeply involved in the establishment of the new Korean Army. He insisted on background checks of recruits to prevent subversion from the left wing. Lee also requested that recruits for the constabulary submit to an ideological background investigation. The very concept of ideological screening, foreign to US values and practices, offended the US advisors. FECOM directed that men be selected from all groups, including leftists, in proportion to the various party strengths in South Korea. Consequently, no investigation of recruits was permitted except physical examinations. Soon barracks became the scene of ideological fighting between leftists and rightists. The first regiment of Constabulary was established in Seoul during January 1946. Eight other regiments were formed by November 1946. The plan to form these regiments was a combined ROK and U.S. product known as the Bam Boo Plan. The Military Government selected a number of the private military groups including

the collaborators who agreed with the Bam Boo plan to assume command positions in the Constabulary. COL Lee did not have any objection to ex-Japanese Korean officers, because he was himself who had served in the Japanese Imperial Army. The problem was why US Military Government in Korea employed him as its advisor even though most Korean people accused these ex-Japanese officers of collaboration or national treason. Soon, afterwards, all private military organizations were disbanded and the majority of the right-wing organizations ended up entering the Constabulary, except one extreme rightist group, known as the Korean Restoration Army. Many members of the Korean Restoration Army asserted that only the former Korean Restoration Army could form the nucleus of a future Korean defense force.

Not surprisingly, conflicts of opinion between US advisors and their Korean counterparts increased in intensity and number. In practice, until the Republic of Korea Government was established in August 1948, the US advisors continued to be the real bosses of the ROK forces. US personnel often did not understand the Koreans' deep concern on the matters of "face" and moral obligations. The US military authorities were generally ignorant of and indifferent to Korean history and culture. The result was tension and misunderstanding with Korean officials. (5)

Under the supervision of the UN Commission, free elections were held only south of the 38th Parallel in May 1948: The National Assembly of South Korea was organized and Syngman Rhee was elected chairman. Later in the summer the Assembly adopted a constitution and elected Syngman Rhee as South Korea's first President. As the prospects for independence increased, interest in the future development of the Korean armed forces also mounted. The rapid demobilization of US forces after World War II and the cutbacks in military expenditures had led to manpower shortages in the armed forces and a close scrutiny of US commitment overseas. In October, 1947, the US JCS asked that General MacArthur and General Hodge provide recommendations on the Korean forces. General Hodge proposed a South Korean Army of six divisions within one year. MacArthur, however, believed the formation of a South Korea Army should be deferred until the UN expressed its wishes. In February 1948, General MacArthur advised the US JCS that the lack of training facilities, the dearth of competent Korean military leaders, and the diminishing capabilities of the US military Government forces to provide the personnel and equipment for an army all argued against the creation of an separate ROK Army. Instead, he favored a increase in the Constabulary to 50,000 men and the provision of heavier infantry type weapons from US sources in Korea and Japan. The US JCS quickly authorized

the augmentation of the Constabulary and the issue of infantry small arms, cannon, and armored vehicles. The US military government increased the constabulary from 3,000 officers and men in early 1946 to 65,000 in late 1949. When the last US troops left Korea that same year, the strength of the South Korean forces reached 116,000; 6,000 Coast Guard, 65,000 Army and 45,000 police.

Under the new 1948 Constitution of the Republic of Korea, the President was Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Armed Forces. President-elect Rhee and General Hodge began an exchange of notes leading to the transfer of authority from the United States Army Forces in Korea to the newly constituted government.

The formal inauguration of the Republic of Korea took place on August 15, 1948, the third anniversary of Korean liberation from Japanese rule. At midnight on that day, the United States military government in Korea ceased.

On August 24, 1948, the ROK President and General Hodge signed an Interim Military Agreement under which the ROK government would gradually assume command of the national security forces. (6) The agreement stipulated that the United States would continue to assist the Koreans in organizing, training, and equipping their forces until

American troops withdrew. To facilitate this assistance, the Commanding General United States Forces in Korea (USFIK) retained the authority to exercise operational control over Korean forces until the agreement expired. The Korean Government compromised its sovereignty by agreeing to relinquish operational control over the new Republic's Armed Forces. Even though President Rhee was Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Armed Forces, and the Korean Officers commanded all the Korean forces, mere paper authority did not equate to the operational control over the armed forces that the new Korean government was entitled to as a sovereign nation. This meant that the ROK enjoyed only limited national sovereignty.

In April 1948, the US National Security Council reported to the President that the US could do one of three things regarding Korea: abandon it, continue to support it politically and militarily with US troops, or extend to the Korean government aid and assistance for the training and equipping of their own security forces, offering extensive economic help to prevent a breakdown of the Korean economy. While withdrawing US troops from Korea, the Truman Administration adopted option three. (7)

By that time, the US-Soviet confrontation in Europe had become the chief US strategic interest; and faced with a

reduced defense budget, the US shifted its attention and funds there. As a result, the US JCS, the Department of Defense, and the NSC supported an early withdrawal from Korea not later than December 31, 1948 for several reasons: 1) The JCS had determined no strategic interest in maintaining American troops in Korea, 2) General MacArthur considered the troops in Korea as "a liability rather than an asset" in the event of a major war, 3) No money was authorized for retaining the troops beyond fiscal year 1949. (8) The Truman Administration made a decision in July to pull out American forces. It projected August 15, 1948 as the date for initiation of the withdrawal of US troops and December 15, 1948 as the date of completion. In conjunction with the decision to withdraw, the Truman Administration tried to strengthen the South Korean economy. It hoped that a revived economy could support and maintain the desired level of military forces.

On October 2, 1948, soon after the initial withdrawal of American troops, the fledgling South Korean government was plagued by sabotage, demonstrations, and armed insurrections in various localities. The disposition of former collaborators including landowners and Japanese-Korean officials who exploited the Korean population under Japanese rule, was not yet resolved. In addition, there existed the possibility of the communists using force to

unify Korea through manipulation of this political disunity in South Korea, the weakness of the new ROK government and the disorganization of ROK defense forces. In view of this situation, the US Department of State concluded in November that the continued presence of US forces would have a stabilizing effect upon the overall situation. Based upon this conclusion, the complete removal of all US troops from Korea was delayed indefinitely. But in March 1949, the US President's advisors concluded that the complete withdrawal of US forces by 30 June was politically militarily desirable. They also advised the President to seek military assistance for Korea in fiscal year 1949-50 and to establish a US military advisory group to assist in training ROK Armed Forces. Between 8 May and 29 June 1949 the last US combat units left Korea, leaving only a US Military Advisory Group (KMAC) consisting of 500 officers and men. The interim Military Agreement signed by President Rhee and General Hodge on 24 August 1948 automatically expired, and the Republic of Korean Government assumed complete and full control of its forces. The KMAC's mission was to organize, administer, equip, and train the Korean Security Forces, which consisted of the Korean Army, the Korean Coast Guard, and the Korean National Police.

In carrying out this mission, the advisory group assigned a US officer to each key position in the Korean

National defense establishment, from the Minister of National defense down to battalion level. This was called the 'counterpart' system. Advisors concerned with education and training did very valuable work assisting the fledgling ROK Armed Forces. Education provided the chance to set up a new tradition by learning new technology.

Tanks, 155 mm howitzers, and certain other heavy items were regarded as too expensive for the military aid program and unsuitable because of inadequate roads and bridges. There is also evidence that some Americans feared the Republic of Korea would embark upon military adventures of its own into North Korea if it had 'offensive-type' equipment.(9) However, it is much more likely that a lack of favorable tank terrain in Korea and dollar limitations were actually responsible for the United States' decision not to provide this type of equipment. Unfortunately, such heavy equipment was also necessary for defense against a strong attack. Had the US advisors known that Russia had transferred tanks to North Korea, where the terrain is much less favorable to tanks than in the south, their reaction might have been different.

In the north, Kim Il Sung asked Stalin to support his plan to launch a military attack on the South Koreans. Stalin told him to come back to Moscow with a concrete

blueprint for the assault. (10) The Russians made the judgment that complete seizure of the Korean peninsula was a precondition for their ultimate aim to dominate Japan. Nevertheless, the US did not recognize the strategic importance of South Korea and completed its troop withdrawal by June 1949.

Secretary of State Acheson made his much-quoted and much-criticized remarks before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950. He said, " ... this defensive perimeter runs from the Aleutians through Japan and then goes to Ryukyus and the Philippines... ". (11)

He publicly declared that the U.S. would fight to defend Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines and that the new nations of Asia were on their own. Both Formosa and the ROK were placed outside of the US forward defensive line. The Soviet leadership saw, in statements of responsible officials, concrete evidence of US unwillingness to make a serious commitment in South Korea. North Korea perceived this public exclusion of Korea from US Pacific Perimeter as a sign of US weak commitment in Korea. They may well have concluded that they had the opportunity, by the forceful unification of Korea to gain substantial strategic advantages cheaply and without serious risks. The public exclusion of Korea from the US Pacific defense perimeter and

the US Congress' decision to reduce drastically US military aid and economic support to the ROK upset the existing balance of power and encouraged North Korea to attempt to communize the whole peninsula by military force.

At least two possible courses of action would have constituted recognition of US special interests in Korea and determination to prevent the North Korean aggression. In addition to leaving KMAG in Korea, the US might have left a token combat force in Korea which without a spoken or written word, would have informed North Korea and its allies that the US did not intend to stand idly by in case of attack. The US might have made it clear that it would give full support to UN collective action in case of attack upon the Republic including the use of necessary armed forces. This would have given solid substance to Secretary of State Dean Acheson's warning which, in the form presented and against the background of the UN's record in dealing with breaches of the peace, it simply did not have.

THE KOREAN WAR

On Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, North Korea People's Army (NKPA) forces invaded the Republic of Korea, driving across the 38th Parallel in an all-out attack. Upon

receiving an official report from US Ambassador Muccio. the US Department of State urgently requested the UN Security Council be convened. A meeting of the Security Council was held. With the USSR boycotting because Nationalist China held the China seat, the Security Council quickly voted that its members should assist South Korea. The resolution adopted by the Council, after noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, declared that the action of the North Korean forces constituted a breach of peace, and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities. It further called upon the North Korean authorities to withdraw their armed forces above the 38th Parallel.(12) North Korean authorities would not heed the Council's resolution.

Prompt and energetic action was of decisive importance in strengthening and revitalizing the principle of collective action to defeat aggression.(13) The Security Council concluded that the North Korean surprise attack was a well-planned, concerted, and full scale invasion of South Korea.(14)

On June 29, the members of the United Nations resolved to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. The Council's

resolution of June 29, simply recommended that collective measures be taken. Quick action was necessary if collective measures, once organized, were to have any chance of success. Late in the afternoon on June 29, President Truman again met with his principal advisors to consider the rapidly changing situation. It was decided to authorize US ships and planes to strike military targets in North Korea and to use Army service troops in South Korea and certain combat units in the Pusan area. In the early hours of June 30, after a visit to Korea, General MacArthur reported that the South Korean Army was confused, retreating and incapable of collective action. He stated that, if authorized, he intended immediately to move a United States regimental combat team to the combat area in Korea as the nucleus of a possible build-up of two divisions from Japan, "for early offensive action in accordance with the FECOM mission of clearing South Korea of NK forces". (15)

Within two weeks of the adoption of the June 29 resolution, naval and air units from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand were actively engaged and units from the Netherlands and Canada were on their way. By the middle of September, the UN reported that fourteen members, other than the US, had contributed or offered to contribute ground forces. A few offers were not accepted because they failed to meet requirements as to size and equipment set by

the United States Government in the discharge of its responsibility for the unified command of United Nations military forces under the Security Council resolution of July 7. Naval forces had been supplied or offered by Australia, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Air force support had been sent or offered by Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, and South Africa. Ground forces in particular were slow in arriving. British units, which arrived in Korea on August 29 and entered the fighting early in September, were the first ground forces of a member other than the US to participate. Units from the Philippines and Australia arrived in September, and from Turkey in October. By the end of 1950, fifteen members of the UN had armed forces, either on the way to Korea or actually engaged in the fighting. Early in 1951, the number was brought to sixteen by the inclusion of a Luxembourg infantry unit.

A July 7 resolution adopted by the Security Council recommended that the members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the Council resolutions of June 25 and 29 "to make such forces and other assistance available to the unified command under the US command". (16) It requested the US to designate the commander of such forces. It authorized the unified command to use the UN flag "in the course of operations against North Korean

forces" and requested the US to provide the Security Council with reports "as appropriate on the course of action taken by the Unified Command." (17)

The following day, President Truman designated General MacArthur as the Commanding General of the United Nations Forces. In addition, he directed General MacArthur to use the United Nations flag as well as the flags of the participating nations.

When the US intervened in Korea in July 1950, the Korean Army had collapsed and President Syngman Rhee knew that the only chance for survival - and for rejuvenation of his armed forces - was to ally the ROK as closely as possible with the US. The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be obtained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority. (18) This exemplified President Rhee's action.

On July 14, President Rhee assigned control of his nation's forces to General MacArthur, stating in a letter transmitted through the US Ambassador to Korea:

"In view of the joint military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea, and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under the joint operational command and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander, United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or adjacent seas". (19)

Thus the US and ROK forces were able to take united, well coordinated actions against the enemy under the banner of the United Nations. Although the action taken by President Rhee was understandable in view of the seriousness of the situation, subordinating the ROK forces to US control would eventually stifle the growth of leadership and acceptance of responsibility essential to the development of the ROK Armed Forces in the years following the Korean War. Such an action would eventually undermine the US basic objective of leaving a strong independent could. Additionally, this event marks a key loss of the role identity with in ROK Armed Forces leadership; one which recently they have begun the struggle to regain.

Establishing the front was a crucial prerequisite for counteroffensive operations. General MacArthur told General Walker, Commander, Eighth US Army, that there must be "no

repetition of Dunkirk". (20) General Walker issued a desperate order to "stand or die" on July 29. "There will be no more retreating, withdrawal, or readjustment of the line, or anything you want to call it." (21) But he soon was forced to make another adjustment. On August 1, he recommended an orderly withdrawal across the Nakdong River to regroup his forces for a final stand. Ironically, for the first time since the outbreak of the war, the UN forces trapped in the Pusan Perimeter, "formed a coordinated defensive line and zone as depicted by the Field Manual." (22) Timely reinforcement was a crucial factor if the besieged troops were to stop the enemy advance.

An easy way to solve the manpower shortage in Korea was to increase the ceiling of the South Korean Army. General MacArthur took the initiative of augmenting the size of the South Korean Army, whose command he had assumed at the request of President Rhee on July 19, 1950. Even before Ambassador Muccio recommended raising the ceiling of 65,000 on August 1, General MacArthur had informed the JCS of his intention to equip four more divisions in the ROK Army. (23) He also developed and applied his additional initiative to meet the manpower needs, with the "buddy system" by which one hundred South Koreans were assigned to each US Infantry company and Artillery battery. The KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) Program was

initiated on August 15, 1950 under an agreement between the ROK President and the CINCUNC. The first KATUSA recruits, legally part of the ROK Army and administratively supported by the ROK Government, were assigned as reinforcement for the understrength 7th US Infantry Division in Japan, which was preparing for deployment to Korea.

In the course of the Korean War, US strategy was unpredictable and inconsistent. From the beginning of the war, US decision makers believed that there would always be the possibility of a direct military clash with the Soviet Union or, and PRC. There was a feeling that the US should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute global war plans. The JCS considered that it would be militarily unsound for the US to commit large forces against the USSR in an areas of slight strategic importance, as well as one of Soviet choice. Until August 1950, the US government clearly set US objectives to restore Korea up to the 38th parallel. It eliminated the possibility of engaging in a general war with either the Soviet Union, Communist China or both. (24) The US government firmly committed itself to the principle of localizing Korean hostilities. Thus the JCS were very cautious in conducting the war in Korea, emphasizing US capability available and possible Soviet moves in other area, especially, in soft spots in Europe and the Middle East. But prior to the

Inchon landings, President Truman approved a revised National Security Memorandum (NSC 81-1) which authorized the UNC forces to advance north of the 38th Parallel in order to defeat the North Korean Army or force its withdrawal from the ROK. After the successful Inchon Amphibious Operation to cut off the NKPA line of communication and subsequent recapture of Seoul, the US government modified its strategy in order to achieve an independent, free, and unified Korea. After Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) massively intervened in the Korean War in late November, US decision makers developed a strategy of an honorable termination of US military involvement while retaining an independent Republic of Korea.

After the CCF intervention in the war, a fixed strategy was firmly established. US political and military planners agreed on the political objectives, military strategy and tactics to pursue in the Korean war. The chief political objective was to stop aggression while leaving the unification of Korea to political negotiations. Military strategy was to hold the line along the 38th Parallel until the enemy accepted an honorable cease fire. The tactical aim was to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy by an effective utilization of the superior fire power of the UN Command, wherever and whenever feasible within Korea.

How, by what channel, and at what level should the talks be invited? Now, the UN command was prepared to end the conflict, not by military victory but by a cease fire. A UNC four-point proposal for a cease-fire was as follows: 1) The complete withdrawal of the Chinese communists from Korea, 2) The complete disarmament of the North Korean Communists, 3) The full participation of ROK representatives in any international conference or meeting discussing the Korean problem, and 4) No arrangement comprising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Korea. (25) General Nam Il, the chief spokesman for the Communist delegation, accepted Soviet suggestion for cease-fire talks.

The representatives of the UNC and NKPA met at Panmunjom in July 1951 and agreed on the following agenda: 1) Adoption of agenda, 2) Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea, 3) Specific arrangements for the realization of a cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition authority and function of a supervisory organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and armistice, 4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war, and 5) Recommendations to the government of countries concerned on both sides. (26)

The battle line would be a military demarcation line with a demilitarization zone of four kilometers. Even more controversial was the question of mandatory repatriation of all war prisoners. The Communists continuously insisted on an all-for-all unconditional exchange, while the UN presented various plans based on the principle of voluntary repatriation.

President Rhee had warned that he wouldn't accept any truce that did not guarantee: 1) Complete withdrawal of Communist Chinese forces from Korea, 2) Complete disarmament of North Korea, 3) United Nations guarantee of help for South Korea and prevention of any outside assistance for North Korea, 4) South Korean participation in any political conference for the Korean problem, and 5) Preservation of the sovereign and territorial integrity of Korea. (27)

The US Department of State urged the ROK Government to remain calm during the negotiations and took strong measures to ensure Rhee's docility after an armistice. The US JCS also prepared for further operations as required in order to: a) Destroy effective communist military power in Korea, b) Reduce the enemies' capability for further aggression in Korea and the Far East, c) Increase the

possibility of acceptance of an armistice on US-UN terms, and d) Create conditions favorable for ROK forces to assume increasing responsibility for operations in Korea.(28)

The UNC had to overcome one serious obstacles - the South Koreans' opposition to the armistice. The barrage of public statements issued by Rhee and continuous public demonstrations were considered to obstructive to the sincere US efforts to terminate the conflict. Washington considered Rhee's action irresponsible but considered that South Korean cooperation was necessary in implementing an armistice. General Mark Clark, CINCUNC, was especially worried about the possible withdrawal of ROK forces from the UNC control.

Almost all South Koreans mobilized in opposing an armistice which failed to unify Korea. On April 21, 1953 the ROK National Assembly passed a resolution calling for support of President Rhee's objective to unify Korea, even by force. Three days later, President Rhee notified President Eisenhower that if the UNC agreed to permit the Chinese Communist forces to remain in Korea, he would withdraw his forces from the UNC and fight on alone. General Clark immediately called on Rhee, though he believed that President Rhee was bluffing. General Clark received a promise that President Rhee would not withdraw South Korean

forces except as a last resort. When General Clark met President Rhee on May 12, the South Korean leader made a plea for larger ROK forces and for a security pact. He was bargaining now to get a security pact to obtain more economic aid, and to make his people feel he was having a voice in the armistice negotiations.

A US/ROK mutual defense treaty and an armistice, in that order, were the basic aims of President Rhee. On June 2, 1953, President Rhee sent a letter to President Eisenhower, offering to give a public pledge to accept the armistice on the condition that a mutual security pact first be concluded. Such a pact must provide for continuous US military aid and immediate military intervention in case of renewed aggression and a possible crusade to unify Korea by force. President Rhee promised to leave his force under the UNC as long as the UNC would cooperate with the ROK Government's efforts to unify Korea. (29)

President Rhee obtained four pledges from the US in return for his pledges not to disrupt the armistice. These US commitments included: 1) Promise of a mutual security treaty, 2) Assurance of long term economic aid, 3) Military assistance to build and maintain twenty ROK divisions with the Navy and Air Force, 4) Close consultation and cooperation before, during, and after the

post-armistice political conference, including simultaneous withdrawal from the conference after 90 days if nothing substantial were accomplished. (30)

After more than two years of frustrating and bitter negotiations, on July 27, 1953, it took only twelve minutes for the two chief delegates, General Harrison, senior representative, UNC, and General Nam Il, senior representative, North Korean People's Army, to sign the armistice documents.

The US and its allies signed a Joint Policy Declaration on July 29 and inserted it in a special UNC report to the UN Secretary General, submitted on August 7, 1953. The contents of the declaration were quite significant, since it contained a concluding sentence warning against aggression not merely in Korea but anywhere in Asia. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America was signed at Washington , D.C. on Oct 1, 1953 and entered into force as of November 17, 1954. he treaty promised that "the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either, their political independence or security is threatened". (31) It also stated appropriate means to deter armed attack.

The Treaty is as follows:

Article 1; The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

Article 2; The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes.

Article 3; Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article 4; The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article 5; This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional process and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

Article 6; This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either part may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Part. (32)

President Rhee paid a state visit to Washington, D.C. in July, 1954, to conduct a summit talk with President

Eisenhower. Among the important issues was the future command relationship between US and ROK forces. As a result, a ROK-US Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was announced as follows: "ROK will retain ROK forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual interest would be served by a change. ... the US will consult fully with appropriate military representatives of the ROK on the implication of the program for support of the Republic of Korea military establishment ... ". (33) The ROK government and the US government agreed under the MOA that ROK would leave its armed forces under the operational control of United Nations Command as long as the UNC was responsible for the defense of Korea. In accordance with President Rhee's letter to MacArthur on July 14, 1950, ROK forces were under the operational control of the UNC as long as the current hostilities continued. Operational control of the ROK forces should have reverted to the ROK Government when the hostilities stopped.

LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR

In addition to the ROK forces, the troops of sixteen nations under the command and control of the United Nations Command (UNC) participated in various combined operations

against combined Communist forces of the Moscow-Beijing axis. Due to the multiplicity of allies, interoperability problems ranged widely from minor cultural differences to major disagreements on tactics and doctrine. Such difficulties often resulted in insufficient cooperation and ineffective combined operations. Although the UNC quickly recognized the problems inherent in the diverse origins of its troops, it had to rely largely on the trial-and-error method to integrate these forces into a single unified command system. Unfortunately, it had no effective doctrine for dealing with combined operations.

During the integration process, almost all of the non-American troops had to be carefully trained and reoriented by the UNC to ensure compatibility with US doctrine. At the initial stage, the UNC assumed that standardization of weapons and ammunition, along with language commonality, would provide the basic framework for allied interoperability. Only after actual integration of non-US/ROK troops had taken place did the UNC begin to realize that other profound problems existed. These included the attitudes and views of commanders and soldiers, mutual misunderstandings, cultural and religious background, and geographical/climatic differences. (34) The combat readiness of the UNC troops depended largely on familiarization training; their ability to integrate US


doctrine, procedure, and operating methods in combat; The UNC also had to consider the personality and linguistic ability of the commanders in addition to such factors as unit strength, equipment, training combat experience, leadership quality, limitations on employment imposed by higher headquarters, availability of reserves, and positioning of UN units relative to other forces on the front line. (35)

US attempts to turn UN units into homogeneous body in combat included: 1) Attaining organizational uniformity through restructuring UN units to fit US Infantry Battalion or Separate Infantry Battalion tables of organization and equipment. 2) Simplifying command and control by attaching small allied units to larger US units, i.e., subordinating allied units to the US command and control system. 3) Standardizing equipment by providing US weapons and equipment. 4) Obtaining qualitative uniformity through familiarization training offered by the UN Reception Center (UNRC) and by parent US units (6-8 weeks' training respectively)-i.e., familiarization with US weapons, equipment, doctrine, and tactics. 5) Facilitating inter-allied communications by using lines of liaison, one from US organizations to UN units, the other from UN units to US signal corps teams to UN units, and 6) Providing logistic systems that could support units other

than US units such as ROK units and British Commonwealth units. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) constituted a major supply requirement in this respect. In short, the US provided all logistic support to UN units.(36)

In July 1951, the command relationship of ROK Army and Eighth US Army was as follows:

Channels of Command, July 1951



^aThe UN Security Council had no command authority, but did receive biweekly reports from the UN Cdr.

^bThe Army Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

^cThe UNCEC exercised operational control only over the air and naval forces under its command.

^dAlthough HQs, US Army Forces, Far East, had not been inactivated, it did not become operational until 1 October 1952.

^eThe Military Advisory Group for Korea was assigned to Eighth Army command.

Source: History office, USFK/EUSA, Republic of Korea and the US Military Experience in Korea (1881-1982) (Seoul, Korea: 1983), p.77

Figure 3-1. Command Relationship of ROK Armed Forces and Eighth US Army in July 1951.

Despite the great US effort to improve the effectiveness of combined operations under a single command and control system, there remained a number of unresolved problems such as tactical differences, language barriers, differences of weapons and equipment, diversity of troop morale, and variation in combat support capabilities. In addition problems often developed between UN and ROK commanders because of negative attitudes fostered by language difficulty and an absence of frequent and candid communication. (37)

Despite these issues, operations involving US and ROK units of the UNC during the Korean War were often successful. General MacArthur's speedy recognition of the necessity for an integrated operations policy quickened the formulation of an adequate forces integration process. The long conflict provided the time needed for the UNC to replace the trial-and-error method with integration, whereas the cold war psychology prevailing among the UNC members aided in the development of common objectives and attitudes toward the war. Though the national aspirations of South Korea for the reunification of the country had once served as a barrier to the objectives of the UNC to conclude a truce and caused major political discord, in the end, all UN members maintained at least one common objective: to defend South Korea against Communist invasion.

Probably the most important factor that enabled the UNC to conduct effective combined operations was the strong will and advanced military capabilities of the US. The US demonstrated a firm commitment to the survival of South Korea to both her allies and her enemies. Massive US troop employment and US logistics support was provided to every UN units except those of the British Commonwealth. Such efforts attested to the durability of the US commitment and encouraged the allied forces to fight in union against their common enemies.

A strategic mistake was made when the armistice talks opened and the UNC accepted the city of Kaesung as a meeting place, which was later shifted to Panmunjom. It is conceivable that the Armistice could have been signed in 1951 if the UNC had demanded a location other than one north of the 38th parallel as a location for the truce talks. The acceptance of a city so close to the line of contact guaranteed that UNC forces could never push farther north than they currently were. Given the criticality of Seoul as a center of economic, political, education, and psychological areas, North Korea and Chinese Communist forces might have attempted to gain more terrain near Seoul. This enabled the Communists to drag out the war much longer than they had if UNC forces had been able to project itself into the north, and intensify the pressure on the

Communists in Korea for a much quicker end to the war.

During the Korean War, the US often had been at odds with the South Korean Government about the strategic and military objectives of the war and about other relevant issues. The President of South Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, believed the conflict as a civil war; that the primary goal was a matter of life or death to the nation. Any retreat of UN troops was, therefore, regarded as a strategic defeat. South Korea also believed that Korea must have the right to restore civil order in the liberated areas with the use of ROK troops and that North Korean POWs should be released.

(38) The US, on the other hand, seemed to believe that the war was an international conflict in which the primary goal was to restore the pre-war status quo.(39)

In addition, the US believed that civil order in the liberated areas should be restored by direct control of the UNC; and that President Rhee's action, releasing POW's, was very harmful to the objective. These disagreements were the result of a chronic lack of understanding between the parties at the national command level. The US was to a large extent unwilling to consider favorably Dr. Rhee's position on many of the post-war issues. This position was reflected in the attitude of the American Embassy staff who could not be counted upon to wholeheartedly present the

Korean position to Washington. Dr. Rhee often had to rely on his personal US advisors in order to express his views to Washington. (40)

Throughout the war and after, CINCUNC exercised the OPCON over the ROK forces as follows: 1) Initial orders were issued to the Commander, ROK ground forces, then disseminated to all ROK forces. 2) The Eighth US Army exercised the war guidance through US Corps due to the increase of the the US forces and UN forces. All UN forces and ROK forces were attached to the US Corps with the exception of ROK I Corps (1950) and ROK II Corps (1951). 3) A ROK field army was activated on March 15, 1954 after the armistice agreement in 1953. The First Republic of Korea Army (FROKA) was OPCON to the Eighth US Army. FROKA took over OPCON of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd ROK Corps, and 4) Second Republic of Korea Army (SROKA) was established on October 31, 1957 under the command of the ROK forces. CINCUNC exercised OPCON over SROKA through Commander, ROK forces. (41)

Major ground forces of UNC and FECOM on 1 July, 1951 was as follow.

United Nations Command and Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951




Figure 3-2. United Nations Command and Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951

THE POST-WAR ERA(1953-1960)

After the Korean War, the US turned from a crisis-oriented military policy toward concepts and programs designed to last as long as its rivalry with the Soviet Union. Along with its containment strategy, to stabilize defense spending, the Eisenhower Administration deemphasized conventional forces and stressed the deterrent and warfighting potential of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons remained at the heart of American strategy. (42) The US JCS felt that local wars of the Korean variety would have to be fought by America's allies, who would use their own round forces, backed by American air and sea forces. At this time the US maintained eight divisions with 327,000 soldiers in South Korea, while Korea had 14 divisions with a strength of 450,000.

On Dec 26 1953, President Eisenhower announced the gradual withdrawal of US forces in Korea and stated that two divisions would withdraw shortly. Three days later, Secretary of State Dulles warned that US bombing of Communist China was a possibility if a Communist invasion were launched again. He said also that this withdrawal was in line with the new defense strategy. The ROK Government insisted on a reconsideration of US forces withdrawal from Korea because of the sharp increase of North Korean

combat aircraft.

On May 6 1954 the United States dispatched General Van Fleet, former Eighth Army Commander, to discuss the force improvement of the ROK Armed Forces.

Agreement between the two sides arranged for the transfer of equipment from the withdrawing units to expedite the improvement of the ROK Armed Forces. The 45th and 40th US Divisions withdrew between March and June 1954 with the announced withdrawal of four more divisions, along with the withdrawal of 200,000 Communist Chinese troops from North Korea. The withdrawal plan was implemented between September 1954 and May 1955. The 1st Marine Division was the last unit to withdraw.

The remaining Eighth Army configuration was I Corps (Group), the "Shield of Seoul," responsible for the defending the critical Western Corridor into South Korea; including the 24th US Infantry Division on the line of the 18.5 mile west-central sector of the DMZ; and the 7th US Infantry Division in the I Corps (GP) reserve. The balance of the 50,000-man ground force structure in 1955 was comprised of a corps artillery element, air defense units, a logistics command and area service and service units. (43) A substantial degree of conventional defense in South Korean

Armed Forces was required to compensate American troop reduction.


The reduction of US Forces in Korea and the reinforcement of the ROK Armed Forces presumed that if forward military capabilities were reinforced, then, it would be possible to reduce American military power. South Korean troops would bridge the possible strategic gap left by an American military reduction in the Far East. This reasoning was quite compatible with the policy of economic stringency imposed by the Eisenhower Administration. To achieve its military, strategic, and economic objectives, the US infused massive amounts of training into the South Korean defense forces.

By 1954, ROK Army manpower strength reached its peak of 450,000. It expanded into twenty full-strength divisions and ten reserve divisions. As previously discussed with the Mutual Defense Treaty, South Korea was officially recognized as a frontier of the containment policy. In order to contain Communist expansion in the Korean peninsula and to protect Japan politically and psychologically, massive military and economic aid was quickly implemented. Furthermore, every year, several hundred US military advisors participated in training the South Korean Army.

In 1955, I US Corps, which was assigned OPCON over the VI ROK Corps on May 22, was redesignated I Corps (Group)

In December 1956, US JCS sent a telegraph message to CINC, Far East Command (FECOM) ordering that Headquarters, UNC collocated at FECOM be moved to Seoul, Korea. As of July 1, 1957, United Nations Command was moved to Seoul and Commanding General, US Forces in Korea, was designated as CINUNC. From the outset of the Korean War to 1957, the senior US headquarters in Korea was Eighth US Army. Its commander commanded all ROK Army forces during the war and the ROK Army forces on the DMZ since then, until the creation of CFC in 1978. Koreans still refer to, the top US officer in Korea as the "Palgun" (i.e. Eighth Army) commander.

After the move of UNC from Tokyo to Seoul, the command relationship was as follows:



Source: Finley, James P. The US Military Experience in Korea, 1871-1982 (Seoul, Korea: Command Historian's Office, Secretary Joint Staff, HQ USFK/EUSA, 1983), p. 107.

Figure 3-3. Command Relationship of Post-Move of UNC to Seoul from Tokyo in July 1957.

As of October 9, 1957, OPCON over US forces in Korea was transferred to CINCPAC from CINCUNC. This action was unilaterally taken by the US authority. In accordance with CINCUNC General Order # 38 on October 9, 1957, Eighth Army Commander assumed command of UNC Ground Component Command; Commander, Naval Forces Korea as Commander, UN Naval Component Command; Commander, the 314th Air Force Division as Commander, UN Air Force Component Command. This complex command system was politically inconsistent with the objective of transfer of OPCON over ROK forces in the Korean War and also was contrary to the unity of command.

(44)

THE MILITARY REVOLUTION

In April, 1960, a student uprising toppled President Syngman Rhee's twelve year regime because of his corrupt election. The Rhee regime did not achieve the economic and political development it sought. It attempted to continue to retain political power by illegal ways. The Hur Chung Interim Government could not meet the aspirations of the people. Continuous demonstration created a social turmoil. As a result of the political instability, a military revolution took place on May 16, 1961.

At that time, all Korean military units were under operation control of UNC. General Park took power by coup using the ROK Marine Brigade and the 6th ROK Corps Artillery and ROK Special Forces Brigade under operational control of CINCUNC. General Cater B. MacGruder objected to the fact that troops under his control were used, and did not support the coup. When the delegate of the revolutionary force explained the necessity of the coup, General MacGruder maintained that the revolution was not acceptable. They countered MacGruder's protest by insisting the revolution was a purely internal South Korean problem. After consecutive contacts between the US forces and the revolutionary government, on May 26, 1961, they agreed that:

- 1) The Commander-in-Chief, UNC exercises the operational command authority in the defense of Korea against external Communist aggression.
- 2) The Marine Brigade and the 6th Corps Artillery as major revolutionary forces with Special Forces Brigade should be returned to their defensive mission under the UNC operational plan.
- 3) The UNC agreed that the Capital Security Command, later activated, should be placed under the control of the Korean Government. The Capital Security Command, the 1st Special Forces Brigade and a few Military Police battalions became an exceptional unit which was not under the operational control of UNC.(45)

Since 1961, the position of CINCUNC, and his responsibilities of enforcing the Armistice have been a consistent

feature of the military structure in Korea.

In the early 1960s, the US adopted a new strategy doctrine based on flexible response. The primary feature of this strategy was flexibility of option in response to the enemy with both conventional and nuclear capability. (46) This required strengthened military capability of forward defense areas such as Korea and NATO. South Korea played a significant role in the concept of this flexible response. South Korea became a counter-revolutionary force. The US was beginning to perceive that the Third World was to be a major testing ground of Communist and American will. Therefore, American concern became how to oppose revolutionary forces in those regions. That was one reason why US got deeply involved in Vietnam.

THE ROK INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR

On September 1, 1965, Korea began its eight year participation in the Vietnam War. The ROK sent troops to Vietnam, not an ally of South Vietnam, but as an ally of the United States in return for US support during the Korean War. Another reason for South Korea's decision to send combat troops to Vietnam was its desire to prevent the weakening of the US security commitment in Korea and, if

possible, to strengthen it. US military assistance to Korea had been getting progressively smaller and advanced military equipment that had been promised to the Korean Armed Forces was not forthcoming on time. Most significantly, there were reports of US plans for a possible transfer to Vietnam of one or more divisions of Korean-based troops in the event that additional troops from US allies were not available for combat. For this reason, a promise from the United States that it would not reduce its troops levels in Korea was the major concession sought by the Seoul government during negotiations leading to the dispatch of the first combat troops to Vietnam. So at this point Korea was not sensitive to US dominance in the UNC/ROK command structure and was attempting to get the US to maintain a strong defense posture against North Korea.

A sense of self-confidence was acquired in the course of the ROK's involvement in Vietnam. Obviously, one major source of that confidence was its rapidly expanding economy, which grew by seventy percent between 1965 and 1970, a growth fueled by national will to modernize Korea, in part, by Vietnam associated projects. In addition, Korea also received a big psychological boost from its experience in Vietnam where the ROK's remarkable military success developed in an autonomous and independent environment. Since the ROK Government requested CINUNC release UNC OPCON

over those units participating in the Vietnam War, the ROK forces, including two combat divisions, were under the operational control of Commander, ROK Forces in Vietnam. When those units returned to Korea in 1973, those units again were placed under OPCON of CINCUNC.

While the ROK was involved in the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union might have attempted to have North Korea assist North Vietnam by dispersing the United States power into the Korean Peninsula and the Vietnam War. During this period, North Korea became more belligerent toward the South. Constant incidents surrounding the DMZ, provoked by North Korea, reminded the US of the possibility of danger on the Korean Peninsula. In January, 1968, the U.S.S. Pueblo was captured by North Korea and 31 North Korean commandos attempted to assassinate ROK President Park, infiltrating through the 7th US Division sector in the DMZ. North Korea's belligerence convinced the US and ROK of the need to strengthen South Korea's military capability. In February, 1968, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Korea to discuss the Pueblo incident and North Korea's raid on Chungwhadae, the President's residence. During his visit, both nations agreed to hold annual Defense Minister conferences, known as the Korea-US Security Consultative Meetings (SCM). Those meetings were to discuss the changing military situation and to establish a common military

strategy on the Korean peninsula. Those annual meetings have enhanced the credibility of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

As a result of frequent hostile acts by North Korea, the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the UNC agreed that counter-infiltration operations were to be placed under the operational control of the ROK JCS, and that the UNC rules of engagement should allow the DMZ unit commanders to counteract North Korean intrusions and ambushes at their discretion. The ROK Government activated two million Homeland Reserve Forces in April, 1968. Meanwhile, the United States Air Forces in Korea doubled Air Force personnel to 10,000 and reinforced air-ground operation capability by the end of 1968.

NIXON DOCTRINE AND US TROOP REDUCTION IN KOREA

In the meantime, although it did not exclude the need for "defense and deployment of allies and friends", (47) the Nixon Doctrine stressed shared responsibility for defense. American policy-makers saw that the failure of Vietnam was partly due to the lack of support from the Vietnamese people and the lack of coordination between American and Vietnamese troops. America realized that unless it had strong support from the indigenous population and troops, it could not

operate its military strategy effectively. This concept of shared responsibility, therefore, was an attempt to defend against Communism but at a low military cost to the US. (48) At this time, the US reduced its forces stationed in South Korea by one-third. The 7th US Division was pulled out of Korea on March 27, 1971. The 2nd US Division was relieved by a ROK army division from its area of responsibility in the DMZ area during March 1971 and was given the mission of the Eighth US Army reserve. Except for the Joint Security Area for the Armistice Committee at Panmunjom, the 155-mile DMZ was now defended entirely by the ROK Armed Forces for the first time in the 18 years since the armistice.

With the withdrawal of the 7th US Division, US I Corps (Group) changed its organization into I Corps (Group) ROK/US, with the first combined Headquarters in Korean history. The staff was drawn from ROK and US officers on a one-to-one ratio. The remaining US combat troops were the 2nd US Infantry Division, the 38th Air Defense Brigade, the 19th Support Command, and subordinate units.

Up to this point the ROK Armed Forces had relied on the US forces and their military aid too heavily. There had been some military leaders who could not do anything without the assistance of the US forces. This tendency had resulted from constant supervision by the US military advisors,

training by the instructors, and study at US military schools. It resulted in a mental attitude in some Korean officers that can best be described as passive and dependent. (49) Ironically, the presence of USFK itself resulted partly from the US neglecting to foster Korea's defense industry, in contrast to the strengthening of the North Korean heavy industrial capability after the Chinese Communist forces in 1958. Fortunately, the US withdrawal forced the ROK government and the soldiers of ROK forces to realize the importance of self-reliance. As an aftermath of the withdrawal, they began to think about Korean-style tactics and a defense policy. Though it would take time to reach the North Korean level of readiness, Korea had created a springboard from which Koreans learned the most precious lesson that, self-reliance was the only way to survive.

Substantial military aid to South Korea was continued until 1973 and then gradually dwindled. US arms sales to the Republic of Korea steadily increased. The declining use of military assistance and increasing reliance on arms sales became the trend of US policy. (50) More important trends emerged in US arms supply toward Korea. The US helped South Korea to establish its domestic arms industry. By the end of the 1970's, South Korea became capable of producing almost weapons and equipment.

The Republic of Korea launched its first five-year Force Improvement Plan in 1976. With an initial fund of \$7.6 billion, the Republic attempted to establish various projects, such as the purchase of more modern fighter bombers and TOW anti-tank weapons, upgrading air defense and tank forces, domestic production of some artillery and small arms, and enhanced logistics and war reserve munitions.

Parallel with weapon systems' development, the ROK government has conducted a six-day Korea wide Ulchi Exercise for the purpose of testing mobilization and contingency plans in the event of a North Korean invasion. In May, 1975, the Ulchi Exercise was merged into the Ulchi-Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise for the first time to test proficiency of a ROK-US combined battle staff.

On June, 1976, the first Field Training Exercise, Team Spirit, was conducted as a combined ROK/US joint air, ground and naval exercise. It tested the loading and reception plans for out-of-country augmentation forces. Such exercises have continued successfully from that time and have increased in size. They demonstrate and strengthen the will of the Mutual Defense Treaty and are designed: 1) To deter another war by North Korea; 2) To provide a field training opportunity above the level of

division size for both the ROK and the US; 3) To develop appropriate tactics, and operational art for the Korean environment, and 4) To enhance the deployment capability of US augmentation forces.

CARTER WITHDRAWAL POLICY

The Carter Administration attempted to define and build its own foreign policy. In total disagreement with President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's concept of a 'balance of power' world, Zbigniew Brezinski, Special Assistant for National Security to the President, argued that, in terms of military, political and economic leverage, the world is, and likely remains, a bipolar one. In this world, the US will face a multiple state of triangular relationship, namely, a competitive triangle of China-Russia-America triangle and cooperative triangle of China-America-Japan. In terms of global strategy, while maneuvering the China-Russia-America triangle, he emphasized the more binding community of developed nations.(51) While attempting to infuse more troops into Europe, the Carter Administration, contrary to the increasing presence of the Soviet Union, drove to reduce American military strength in East Asia. President Carter's announcement of US Ground troop withdrawal from Korea created an enormous sense of

insecurity in South Korea. (52)

President Carter's withdrawal plan as announced during the 1977 election campaign was significantly modified due to a number of international developments and American domestic political process. According to his revised schedule, the first phase of the withdrawal plan involving 6,000 men, who were originally planned to withdraw in 1978, were rescheduled to withdraw in 1979. By the end of 1978, 3,400 men were withdrawn, including 800 combat troops from the 2nd US Infantry Division. The remaining 2,600 men involved in the first phase were scheduled to withdraw from South Korea by January 1, 1980. As US ground troops in Korea were reduced, US Air Force Tactical Fighter Squadron, comprising 12 F-4D Phantom jets moved into South Korea.

The Carter Administration reevaluated its withdrawal plan when confronted with a massive jingoistic outcry of the domestic right wing in the US which rallied around General John Singlaub, then Chief of Staff, CFC. In addition to, the Iranian incident and Russian invasion of Afghanistan again led President Carter to reevaluate the strategic importance of South Korea. (53)

President Park strongly urged the Carter Administration to reconsider the withdrawal policy in 1977. Given the

North Korean hostilities and superior military power, the ROK government felt that US security support including US troop presence in Korea was significant and required for the ROK national survival and modernization.

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CHAPTER IV

TRANSITION TOWARD EQUALITY

ESTABLISHMENT OF ROK-US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND

It was in the mid-1970s, when some of the voices of the Third World in the United Nations were pressing for the dissolution of the United Nations Command, that the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed to establish a ROK-US combined command system. The organization was also brought up at the tenth ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in 1977 when the US gave notice of its withdrawal policy and in July 1978, when the ROK and the US agreed on the organization and function at the eleventh SCM.

ROK-US military relationship after the creation of CFC was based on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, not United Nation. The legal foundation of CFC in relation to the treaty is as follows:

"...Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific

area...the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack separately or jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measure in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes...".(2)

Subsequently Article II, ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, especially the term consultation is a key concept for ROK-US military relationship as well as the starting point of CFC.

On November 7, 1978, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command was activated in accordance with Strategic Directive 1 issued by ROK-US Military Committee. The establishment of CFC was designed to act as an interim mechanism by which the operational control of the ROK Armed Forces would, in part, be returned to Korea. The new CFC structure enabled top ROK military officers to participate in operational decision-making.(3) The creation of CFC was a turning point in the ROK/US military command relationship from "father-son relationship to brother-in-arms relationship".(4)

In previous years, the problems of ROK inexperience in exercising command and control over their own forces were pointed out as major strategic weaknesses in the ROK military posture. At the same time, operational control

over ROK forces had been exclusively exercised by a senior US officer through the UNC. For over a quarter of a century, the UNC remained responsible for, not only the armistice related matters and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), but also for the defense of the Republic of Korea. But no Korean officers served in the headquarters. Due to the shrinkage of the UNC function in charge of the talks on the violation of the Armistice Agreement and the function of other UN nations' involvement in future Korean conflicts, the Korean peninsula seemed to decline even in symbolic status from worldwide to bilateral one. (5)

Signalling a growing ROK military maturity, a fundamental change in operational control came with the activation of the binational CFC. The CINCCFC was "dual-hatted" as CINCCFC. As the CINCUNC, his responsibility was limited solely to armistice affairs, and the ROK forces with front line missions were transferred from UN Command to CFC operational control. Almost all US forces remained under the command of US Forces in Korea (USFK) and its service "Component Command" the most visible of which is the Eighth US Army (EUSA). The signification in the change was that CINCUNC exercise control unilaterally, but under CFC, operational control is exercised within a joint and combined environment. The implementation of operational control evolved from a unilateral exercise of

authority into a cooperative relationship to execute Combined operation. (6)

On April 14, 1980, I Corp (ROK/US) Group was redesignated as Combined Field Army (ROK/US). The new name more effectively and accurately represented the size, scope, and operational tasking of the command and does not affect its overall organization structure or its mission to defend the western sector of the forward area. The command is headed by a US three star general and is staffed half by ROK and half by US personnel. Because its commander closely observes and monitors the ROK combat units under the military operational and strategic thought of the ROK officers in a practical way. The recent further evolution of the combined defense is typified by the change in the role of the Third ROK Army (TROKA), was not responsible for defending its part of the DMZ. That mission, along with OPCON of TROKA was given OPCON for half of its forward Corps. This was done to acknowledge the maturity of the ROK military. (7)

CFC COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

The current Command relationship of ROK-US Combined Forces Command is as follows:




Figure 4-1. Command Relationship of CFC in November 1978

Source: Cushman, John H. Command Arrangement in Korea: Issues and Options (Seoul, Korea: CSIS/DIDA INTERNATIONAL Conference on the Future of ROK-US Security Relations, Sept 12-13, 1988). p.7.

The stated purpose of the CFC is to dissuade North Korea from renewal of hostilities, by firmly expressing the strong combined wills of the ROK and the US to employ their military force to defend South Korea, if deterrence fails.

The mission and function of CFC is clear as follows:

a. To deter hostile acts of external aggression against the ROK by a combined military effort of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea and, in the event deterrence fails, to defeat an external armed attack against the Republic.

b. To accomplish this mission, CFC performs the following functions:

1) Receives strategic direction and its mission from the Military Committee.

2) Exercises operational control over all forces assigned or attached to the command in prosecution of assigned missions.

3) Makes recommendations to the Military Committee concerning military requirements and other functions with assigned missions.

4) Plans for the employment and support of those forces assigned, attached, or designated for assignment in contingencies.

5) Plans and conducts joint and combined exercise of those forces assigned or attached to validate operational

combat readiness.

6) Provides intelligence support for the execution of assigned activities in Korea to include collection of information on the enemy's conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities, preparation and dissemination of combined intelligence production, and continuous monitoring of indicators of attack.

7) Makes recommendations for developing, equipping, and supporting assigned and attached military forces.


8) Complies with armistice affairs directives of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

9) Supports CINCUNC with combat forces, if necessary, in response to armistice violations by the opposing side. and

10) Researches, analyzes and develops strategic and operational concepts. (8)

The peacetime command relationship of CFC is as follows:

Peacetime command relationships of CFC



NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY GUIDELINES-----
 DEFENSE POLICY GUIDANCE-----
 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND DIRECTIVES-----
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL—oc——oc—
 COMMAND AND CONTROL EXCEPT OPCON—cc——cc
 COUNTER-INFILTRATION OPCON—ci——ci—

Peacetime Command Relationships of the CFC

Source: Rhee, Taek Kyung, US-ROK Combined Operation
 (Washington, D.C. National Defense University Press, 1986), p.34.

Figure 4-2. Peacetime Command Relationship of CFC.

The CFC is basically responsible to the ROK/US Military Committee which is co-chaired by the US and ROK chairmen of the JCS. Members of the Military Committee are, in addition to the Chairmen, JCS of both countries, US CINCPAC, CINCCFC, and one designated ROK officer. Military Committee meetings have two different sessions: a plenary session with participation by all members is usually held on an annual basis in conjunction with the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting and a permanent session held during the periods between plenary sessions at the request of either country. In the absence of the Chairman, the US JCS, CINCCFC or the senior US military officer in Korea may act in his stead.

The function of the ROK/US Military Committee is to issue appropriate strategic guidance to the CFC for the defense of South Korea. The Military Committee compiles defense guidance and policies that are ratified at defense ministry meetings. ROK/US defense ministers meetings are to be held annually or any time one is required. In view of the need to adhere to common views in a war, defense ministry meetings and Military Committee meetings are highly valuable for effective functioning of CFC.


Defense ministry meetings may deal with the issues related to overall deterrence or preparation for and conduct

of a war. Complying separately with the directions of their national command authority, defense ministers may provide general defense guidelines to the Military Committee, which will then transform them into strategic directives that will be carried out by CFC.

There is, however, no organization to work out day-to-day problems for the Military Committee or the defense ministers to consider. An ad hoc committee at the working level is usually formed to prepare for and to follow up on the meeting of the ministers and Military Committee. Moreover, there has been no common institutional process to coordinate diplomatic views. Since the lessons from the Korean War show that political discord caused by a lack of candid and frequent diplomatic communications could have resulted in disastrous relations between allies, failure to establish an institutionalized procedure on the ministry side is lamentable. Political or diplomatic level participation including Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State should add to the SCM. (9)

The wartime CFC command structure is as follows:

CFC Command Structure



NCC	Naval Component Command
CUWTF	Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force
GCC	Ground Component Command
CAF	Combined Aviation Force
ACC	Air Component Command
TROKA	Third Republic of Korea Army
CFA	Combined Field Army (ROK/US)
FROK	First Republic of Korea Army
CAP CORPS	Capital Corps

Source: Cushman, John H. Command Arrangement in Korea: Issues and Options (Seoul, Korea: CSIS/KIDA International Conference on the Future of ROK-US Security Relations, Sept 12-13, 1988). p.2.

Figure 4-3. Wartime Command Relationship of CFC.

CFC is the air/land/sea command which the two nations have set up under an American commander in chief who is responsible jointly to the two nations for the defense of the Republic of Korea national territory.

CFC has three armies deployed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), each with two or three ROK Army corps. Third ROK Army and First ROK Army are commanded by Korean four-star generals; day-to-day they have only ROK forces. Between the two ROK flank armies is the ROK/US Combined Field Army (CFA), commanded by an American three-star general; wearing another "hat" he also has OPCON of the 2nd US Infantry Division day-to-day. In this figure the VII ROK Corps, employed as CFC reserve, is not under a field army; it could be under one in a different situation.

The Air Component Command (ACC), whose commander also commands the US Seventh Air Force and the nominal Air Force "component" of US Forces Korea, in time of war consists of all USAF and ROKAF wings operating from bases in Korea. The Naval Component Command (NCC), commanded by a ROK vice-admiral, consists of the ROK Navy's three coastal fleets and the ROK Navy's Marine divisions; the latter may come under one or the other field armies or corps in peace or war. There is also a ROK/US Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force (CUWTF) and a ROK/US Combined Aviation


Force (CAF).

The ROK government has agreed that CINCCFC has day-to-day "operational control" of the ROK forces for the mission of defense against North Korea invasion. This differs from NATO, where national forces are not OPCON to the coalition US commander until a crisis, and then only by each member's decision at the time. The OPCON grant is specially for the planing and execution of operational plans for defense of the ROK. (10)

COMPLEX COMMAND AND CONTROL

The CFC command and control structure is as follows:

COMPLEXITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL



COMMAND AND CONTROL cc cc _____
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL (PEACETIME) ocp ocp _____
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL (WARTIME) ocw ocw _____
 COMMAND WITHOUT OPERATIONAL CONTROL cx cx _____
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR COUNTER-INFILTRATION ci ci _____

Source: Rhee, Taek Kyung, US-ROK Combined Operation (Washington, D.C. National Defense University Press, 1986), p.34.

Figure 4-4. Command and Control Structures of CFC

The command and control systems of the allied forces in Korea are arranged in such a way that the UNC's basic peacetime function is to maintain the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The CFC is oriented to preparing for the military invasion of the Republic. The relationship between the CFC and UNC, however, is a cooperative and supportive one. The CFC is expected to comply with UNC orders to maintain the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to provide support for UNC efforts if it is requested to do so. In essence, the command and control systems of the allies forces in Korea are arranged in such a way that the senior US military officer in Korea is responsible to the US National Command Authority (NCA) for keeping the terms of Armistice Agreement. At the same time, he is responsible for keeping the defense of South Korea to both the US and ROK NCAs through a combined command and control channel.

Not all the authorities of command and control are, however, exercised by CINCCFC. The Minister of National Defense, ROK, possesses the authority of command and control over major combat forces not mandated to CINCCFC. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROK, also assumes the authority of operational control for the counter-infiltration operations over all the South Korea units in rear areas, over Home Land Reserve Forces, and over police troops.

Although CINCCFC has authority for operational control over major South Korean combat units, he has no responsibility for operational control over US combat units in Korea. If he wants to exercise command and control over USFK and UN units, he must rely on the good auspices of Commander, USFK and UN units. It is only when the United States establishes Defense Condition III or II that CINCCFC can assume operational control over some US combat units in Korea.

Command relationship of the CFC with the JCS and the Ministry of the National Defense, South Korea, can provide guidance or directives for defense policy and strategy to CINCCFC only with the agreement of US counterparts at the Military Committee Meeting or at the SCM of the defense ministers. CINCCFC, as a member of the plenary session and as a co-chairman of the permanent session of the Military Committee meeting, can, of course, participate in formulating strategic guidance or directives, although this is theoretically a function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both nations.

The relationship, between the CFC and the Headquarters of ROK services is, however, a cooperative and

supportive one. The CFC exercises OPCON over major combat units that are under the command, less operational control, of the ROK chiefs of staff.

The complex role of the Commander-in-Chief, CFC must be discussed to comprehend the CFC command and control structure: 1) He is CINCUNC. 2) He is also CINCCFC. 3) He is Commander, Ground Component Command of the ROK/US CFC. 4) In addition, he is Commander, Ground Component Command of the UN Command. This exists on the paper in the event a ground element from a nation accredited to the UN Command should be reintroduced to Korea (e.g., in the outbreak of war). No separate GCC headquarters is visualized. 5) He is also Commander, US Forces Korea. USFK is a US-only "sub-unified command" of the US Pacific Command. In the role of Commander, USFK, his superior is CINCPAC. 6) He is Commanding General, Eighth US Army (EUSA). EUSA is the "army component" of USFK. Its heritage is distinguished, but its functions today are essentially administrative and logistical. As the US Army's top officer in Korea, CG, EUSA commands, through the Service channel, the Commander, CFA (wearing the hat of Cdr, US Army element, CFC), and the CG, 2nd Infantry Division. 7) Finally, there is the position of Senior US Military Officer assigned in Korea. Representing the Chairman, US JCS, the senior officer serves as the US member of the ROK/US Military

Committee in Permanent Session; the ROK member is the Chairman, ROK JCS. (11)

The complexity of command and control systems now existing in Korea can be summarized as follows:

1) CINCCFC exercises operational control over some US and ROK units, UNC's mission is to ensure the enforcement of the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROK, exercise operational control over ROK units for counter-infiltration operations in rear areas, over Home Land Reserve forces, and police units.

3) The Minister of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of each service exercise command and control, but not operational control, over major combat units that are assigned to CINCCFC. They exercise operational control over some ROK units that are not mandated to CINCCFC.

4) CINCCFC exercises command and operational control over all US forces in Korea in war time, not peacetime.

5) CINCCFC exercises operational control, not command and control, over major combat units of ROK forces and two alert fighter squadrons of US forces. He may assume authority for operational control over US combat units when the US NCA declares certain defense conditions. CINCCFC is authorized to respond to the request of CINCCUNC for keeping the Armistice Agreement or of JCS/MND for counter-infiltration

operations in peacetime. JCS/MND and the Chiefs of Staffs of each service of the ROK Forces may provide rear area security in connection with frontal operations of CFC. (12)

OTHER PROBLEMS

It goes without saying that a single unified command system is the most effective way to conduct combined operations. It is practically impossible, however, to integrate all the allied forces into one command system, whether it be the UNC or CFC. The UNC has not been authorized to integrate non-UN units and UN units, the ROK National Command Authority has not been either for the operational control over UN units, because the CFC is basically designed for the combined operations of ROK and US forces. The current dual command and control systems seem, however, an acceptable arrangement to carry out peacekeeping tasks while maintaining a structure capable of conducting combat operations.

The inconsistency between the peacekeeping mission of the UNC and war-fighting tasks of the CFC seems to pose added problems for the effective combined operations of allied forces. Actually, most ROK and US units assigned to peacekeeping tasks while under UNC control will be engaged

in combat tasks during wartime under the CFC's operational control. Continuity of the function of Commander-in-Chief can actually exist, because the senior US officer can assume authority over the CINC's of UNC, CFC and USFK. He may utilize either UNC units, CFC units, or USFK units in accordance with the appropriate command system of each. Units would be controlled through different command staffs, however, when they shift from peacekeeping duties to combat operations.

Unfortunately, there is no staff organization to link the many functions of these various commands. The US senior officer has sole authority to link these command systems. The complexity derives from the fact that one man is burdened with too many tasks in too many commands.

Although most of these organizational problems originated from the complexity of international politics, they were promoted to some degree by differences in ROK and US attitudes toward the defense of South Korea. South Korea wants to defend its territory, without any hesitation and at all cost; US and UN members, on the hand, prefer to have more options with regard to renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula. (13)

The difference of attitudes is well expressed in the

current arrangement of the CFC operational control system. No single US unit is assigned to the OPCON of CINCCFC in peacetime, while most combat units of ROK forces are assigned to the CFC.

This arrangement poses a problem for CINCCFC in his efforts to improve the interoperability of combined forces in peacetime. As he controls no single US unit in peacetime, he has no real power to impose his concept of effective combined operations upon US units. Theoretically, he does have the authority to recommend actions to enhance the interoperability capabilities of US units, since many of them will be under his OPCON in wartime. Of course, he may be able to suggest ways to improve the interoperability of US units, not as CINCCFC but as Cdr, USFK or the senior US officer. This is a real problem. His authority in this case lies only in recommending matters relating solely to US forces, not to the interoperability of US units in the combined operations. But, in theory, he has no structured way to improve the interoperability of the ROK units that are under his operational control. If the theoretical limit to CINCCFC's authority is adhered to, then the only way CINCCFC could improve the effectiveness of combined operations would be to develop recommended doctrine for the employment of US and ROK forces in combined operations.

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CHAPTER V

REARRANGEMENT OF ROK-US MILITARY COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS POST-SEOUL OLYMPICS

In the past few decades, the Republic of Korea has developed dynamic economic and political systems. The ROK's amazing progress since the end of the Korean War was exemplified in its staging of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. As a result, these changes have significantly enhanced the Korean people's pride and gained them international respect. The Korean nation has diligently labored and persevered over the years to raise itself above the destruction of the war of 1950. In 1988, the Seoul Olympics allowed Korea to reintroduce itself to the world as a modern, mature and dynamic republic, fully ready to assume its place as an equal among the international community. While Korea has steadily grown, changing at an ever increasing rate, its relationship with the US has not kept pace. Nowhere is this condition more plainly exemplified than in its military command relationship with the US. This relationship remains unchanged since the signing of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. This is a situation that neither nation can afford to ignore any longer. The challenges to the ROK-US security relationship in the future

are primarily challenges of success. This chapter shows why the current politically complex arrangement in the Korean-American military command relationship is outdated, and in many ways, unacceptable to the modern Korean nation..

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGES

When the concept of Korean nationalism is raised in discussions of the ROK-US relations, it is normally treated solely as a Korean phenomenon which causes problems for Americans because the US frequently is the focus of Korean xenophobia. (1)

President Park's assassination in 1979 and the assumption of office by the Chun Administration caused new problems in ROK-US relations. The impassioned discussion of the ROK Army's suppression of the May 1980 Kwangju uprising brought the matter of the American CINC's OPCON of Korean forces painfully to the forefront. American authorities in Korea have long claimed that they took no part in the decision to use the ROK Army at Kwangju and that the action was under ROK Army command. In accordance with an article by former US Ambassador Gleysteen, the impression among Koreans is that General John Wickam, then CINCCFC, discussed the matter with ROK military authorities and "released" at

least some of the forces used at Kwangju from CFC OPCON to ROK Army command. (2) One segment of Korean opinion has long blamed Americans, especially the American military, of being "in bed with" the authoritarian regime, as they put it. Kwangju gives that element another drum to beat, which certainly complicates any discussion of ROK/US command arrangements.

Unlike the early Park years, Chun's early years were marked by reasonably amicable relations with Washington. During the Chun years, politically instigated anti-Americanism grew to previously unknown levels. (3) As the US in the 1980s began to exert serious pressures on the ROK for an open market, currency revaluation, and more sympathy for an US domestic economic problems, Seoul was less forthcoming than many Americans expected it to be. Anti-Americanism--- fueled by political and economic causes--- threatened to get out of control. As present and future ROK-US economic tensions play themselves out, they are likely to have an impact on ROK-US security relations. In 1988, Korean exports to the United States were 38.7 percent of total Korea's exports and the imports from the US constituted 21.4 percent of Korea's total imports. The US, on the other hand, sent 3.2 percent of its total exports to Korea, while importing

4.2 percent from Korea. In total, the volume of US Korea trade transactions was 30.7 percent of the total Korea's foreign trade and 3.9 percent of all US foreign trade. This is clear evidence of significance for Korea. Meanwhile, from a Korean businessman's perspective, the imbalance in trade should not threaten the US. (4) This factor is not often considered when the United States seeks a resolution to a trade dispute. Most Americans who care at all about Korea have some sense of pride about the role the US played in helping the ROK to survive and prosper. When confronted by a vibrant, prospering Korean economy that is capable of challenging and negotiating with the US as a full trading partner, these same Americans may interpret this as a sign of ingratitude. This feeling might be something like, the Korean saying, "A frog does not remember being a tadpole," when Americans feel that the Koreans challenge their mentor and benefactor. (5)

As the ROK continues to mature economically, politically, and militarily, it seeks to remain a close ally of the US. If economically or politically-based nationalism becomes disruptive to smooth security ties, the ROK-US collective security system could be seriously effected. It is recognized by both nations that national security is intertwined with political, economical, and psychological factors. It is in both Seoul's and Washington's long term

interests to become much more responsive to Korea's aspirations for greater strategic self-reliance within the alliance.

To identify the key issue that must be faced by ROK and US decision makers, one must carefully examine ROK domestic politics. Until Chun's government, the two governments could deal with matters of ROK/US command relationships with little concern for the opinion of Korean intellectuals or of the men in the street. That era passed away. Korea now has a remarkably free press. These matters are now openly discussed in news stories, editorials, academic debates, and by the public at large. Through the last days of the Chun regime the ruling government party could control any debate on these matters in the National Assembly. Now that the liberal parties have the controlling majority in the Korean National Assembly, the temptation for them to make "political hay" out of these issues is sure to be irresistible.

A growing number of well-educated Koreans have begun to argue that the current level of economic achievement requires a more liberal, pluralistic, and democratic political system, commensurate with Korea's economic achievement. The demand for political freedom has been particularly strong among a new generation of Koreans who do

not have first-hand experience of either the Korean War or Korea's poverty of the 1950s and 1960s.

Particularly disturbing to the United States is the rise, although greatly distorted in size, of anti-Americanism in South Korea. There has been a growing feeling among the new generation of South Koreans, primarily particularly young students, that the United States has not been helping the cause of democracy, and reunification in the Republic of Korea.

With the successful implementation of the direct popular election of the ROK President in December 1987, the peaceful transfer of governmental power took place in February 1988. Political maturity in Korea has eventually led the Korean people to think about a fundamental issue of sovereignty; operational control of its own armed forces. Political democratization of South Korea has also dramatically improved its image abroad. With respect to the ROK/US security relationship, Koreans feel that the bilateral relationship should be revised to ensure that American policies and posture accommodate South Korea's new strength and national pride. It is inevitable that the people would become more aware of the issue of operational control. President Roh's government cannot ignore the Korean public aspirations of regaining OPCON of its own

forces. As a result, the Roh government will also not be as responsive to US pressure as much as it is to the Korean public that supports it. President Roh has been popularly elected. New National Assemblymen were recruited by a free general election. Washington will have to adjust its military ties with Seoul, to accommodate the changing nature of Korean politics. In this context, it is desirable to realize greater equity in the command relationship and to lower the current high visibility of US forces in Korea while raising that of the ROK forces.

Changing the relationship of the respective forces encompasses a certain amount of risk. One risk is that the American public could easily misinterpret these events to constitute a South Korean desire for a US pullout. It is important that both governments actively work to ensure both ROK/American people understand that this change in relationship represents the natural maturation of a vibrant, strong alliance. Both the ROK National Assembly and the US Congress must see these events as what they actually are: a necessary adjustment to accommodate the growth of a long standing ally. The threat to ROK/US interests in Korea has not changed and US presence absolutely needs to continue. However, the thirty six year evolution of South Korea requires that both nations reevaluate how they will go about meeting this threat. A new relationship should enhance the

ROK/US alliance; not weaken it.

In addition, Koreans must be tolerate of the strong visceral reaction of the American government against any change in this long standing relationship. There is a strong feeling among Americans that the US has been "had" in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. There is a feeling that the US defends the Pacific rim as a "hired gun" of the Asian nations and that the US economy pays the price. The US government must be aware of these feeling and therefore, cannot pursue a long-term policy that ignores the deep-seated sentiments of the electorate.

Indications that radical students and their cohorts are about to shift to the issues of US troop pullout and cancellation of Team Spirit Exercise in Korea simply underscore how command relationship and politics in Korea are intertwined. (6) The demands by South Korean militant students and radical intellectual groups for the removal of the US presence, particularly US ground forces, have increased in intensity. The Team Spirit Exercises were designed as a show of force against a menacing military build-up by North Korea. Recent ROK/US intelligence estimates placed North Korean troop strength at more than one million, much of it concentrated near the border with the South. The Soviet Union continues to supply Pyongyang

with such military hardware as advanced jet fighters and medium-range missiles. In addition, the north has constantly described Team Spirit as provocative and linked its criticism of it to a demand that US troops be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula. North Korea has continued to exploit US presence in the ROK as a stumbling block to negotiate with the South on reunification. By attempting to weaken the ROK/US military alliance, North Korea has never given up their objective to achieve the communization by force. Team Spirit Exercises and US presence in Korea have played a crucial role in deterring war on the peninsula through demonstrating strong US commitment. There is no reason to assume that the ROK/US alliance could not be maintained with a reduced US presence.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE ROK/US MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

In the preceding section, the political and social setting was established that creates the need to reevaluate the ROK/US military command relationship.

THE ISSUES OF COMMAND AUTHORITY AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL

"Command authority" over the Korean armed forces resides irrevocably with the ROK government. The Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command is currently afforded only "operational control" limited to the execution of combined operations taken to defeat all external attacks on the ROK. That is, "command authority" is the general right to issue orders necessary to manage the military, while "operational control" is a restricted right, exercised only during operations. While the CINCCFC possesses operational control he should not possess command authority.

The issue of command and control is highly emotional and charged with nationalism. The command structure in relation to operational control has been one of the sub-issues under discussion at the annual Minister/Secretary of Defense Security Consultative Meeting. Of the ten items related to the command structure were selected at the 20th annual SCM in 1989, a major issue was the operational control issue. From the Korean people's perspective, an increase of ROK national responsibility for the various command positions within CFC is inevitable. It is generally held that the actual timing of changes as major the transfer of operational control will come soon. (7)

Among the issues considered in the present relationship debate are: ROK sovereignty; the symbolism of

the US command and the UN linkage. Another will be treated separately --- US troop withdrawal.

Concerning the ROK sovereignty, it is only natural for a sovereign state to exercise exclusive command and operational control of its own armed forces. Therefore, on the grounds of national sovereignty, today there are those who insist that the operational control "transferred to the US " during the Korean War must be returned. General Richard Stilwell has often been quoted to effect that the arrangement as it stands is "the most remarkable concession of sovereignty in the entire world". (8) Concern over this situation has been the driving force in most of the changes in the command relationship to date.

It is well within Korea's right to take over operational control of its assets. This logic is reflected in President Roh's Campaign remarks:

"It is natural to restore the right to operate our armed forces if we are armed with sufficient defense capabilities. But our military strength amounts to no more than 62% of North Korea's at present. The level should increase to 80% for a balance of military power with our own military capacity. At that time the situation will be created in which Korea and the United States could develop our military relationship one step higher". (9)

Comparision of North-South Korea Military Power

	South Korea	North Korea
Active	629,000	842,000
Reserves	4,500,000	Army 500,000 Navy 40,000 Militia 5,000,0000
Army	542,000 2 field armies 7 corps 2 mech div 19 inf div 7 special warfare bde Reserve: 1 army 23 div MBT:1,500 APC:450 Tow Arty:3,100 SP Arty:100 MRL:140 AD gun:400	750,000 1 armor, 3 mech, 8corps 25 inf div 15 armd bde 20 mot inf bde 1 special purpose corps 80,000;25 bde MBT:3,000 APC:1,400 Tow Arty:1,600 SP Arty:2,300 MRL:2,500 Ad gun:8,000
Navy	54,000 Submarines:3 Coastal cbt:105 Missile craft:11 Prime surface cbt:29 DD:11 Frigatyees:18 Nav air:17 cbt air:21 Marine Corps:25,000	39,000 21 365 30
Air Force	33,000 473 cbt ac, FGA:18sqn 24 F-16 260 F-5A/B/E Fighter:4 sqn with 68 F-16 Transport:4 sqn	53,000 800 cbt ac, 80 Hel bombers:80II-28 FGA:9 reg Fighter:12 regt with 160 Mig-21 60 T-6, 46 Mig-23 Transport:10 regt
Para- Military	Civilian Defense Corps (to age 50) 3,500,000 Coast Guard:3,500 Patrol craft:15	Security troops 38,000 inc border guard
* US Forces	40,300 Army:29,000 1 army Hq, 1 inf div 1 SSM bty with Lance Air Force:11,200(1 div) 2 wings:168 cbt ac	Worker/peasant Red Milit 3,000,000(up to age 50)

Source: IISS, Military Balance 1988-1989, (London: September,1988). pp. 167-169

Figure 5-1. Comparision of South-North Korea Military Power

In regard to symbolism, the deterrent value of both the US commander and the forward deployment of the US ground forces is another factor to take into account. That a US officer is in command and is therefore in a position to immediately request a quick and decisive US commitment to Korea in times of crisis or hostilities is seen as giving substance to the US commitment. (10) However, in practice, the existence of an American force in Korea as the "tripwire" in the event of hostilities, would carry much more weight than the request of any single US officer of any rank with the US government.

CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

On the peninsula, the evolution of the command will have to reflect the maturation of Korea. Psychological dependence and assertment have replaced dependence on US leadership. however, North Korean armed forces remain a real and present threat, and despite calls for increased South-North contacts and non-aggression declarations, there is every indication that the North will remain committed to realizing reunification under Communist rule. To meet these challenges, the growth in South Korean military capabilities and evolution in Korea's security cooperation with the US should be complementary.

The time is coming when operational control of Korean forces based on Korean perception, must be returned to Korean authority. The current, as well as future ROK administrations will have to redress the perception of subordination involved in the present CFC structure and reassert its national sovereignty. In all probability, this natural desire of the Korean people will be intensified by domestic political pressure and the intricacies of dealing with North Korea.

The evolution of the combined command's scope and orientation certainly will be influenced in part by the two countries' views of their proper regional role. Both in command relationship and in force structure there will be major changes.

Regarding to reduction or pullout of US troops from Korea, if the ROK disputes the US regional role, the ramifications for CFC's peninsula role would also be significant. US forces on the peninsula could become issues of contention. If they are unwelcome, or if as host country the ROK seeks either a measure of control over their off-peninsula use or compensation for basing rights, then the US might feel forced to shift them elsewhere. This could draw down the size of the direct US commitment to CFC

by those US forces and command elements earmarked for a regional mission.

If CFC retains its primarily North Korean orientation, and the US regional role does not become a complicating factor, then CFC structure should evolve to reflect growth in Korean capabilities and aspirations. As the Republic's military forces become more capable, there will be an inevitable draw-down of US forces as they become less vital for the defense of Korea. This change in force mix should be reflected in CFC's command structure.

If Korea seeks to free itself from the appearance of dependence on the US, while maintaining the basic security cooperation network, then CFC would undergo radical changes. Possibly under these circumstance the basic structure of the security relationship could shift from a combined command to an "allies-but-separate" command systems, C3I capabilities, theater strike capabilities, force projection capabilities, increase logistics support capability, and increase its naval and air arms. If this happens, CFC might evolve into a skeletal planning headquarters to be activated upon the initiation of hostilities, with peacetime "command" residing in ROK Ministry of National Defense and US Forces in Korea.

Concerning the UNC linkage, if the Republic believes

that significant progress can be made in tension reduction talks with the North, and that these issues would be better managed by a sole South Korean authority, then the need for the UNC may come under review. The UN Command, once the basis for ROK-US military cooperation, has been supplanted by CFC. In an effort to facilitate dialogue with North Korea, the ROK might either seek to have its legal authority recognized within the UNC or CFC structure, or may desire to see it replaced. (11)

If the US economy should decline precipitously and the Korean share of the "burden" is perceived as inadequate in American eyes, then demands in the US for reduction or elimination of defense commitments abroad could rise. On the other hand, if the Korean government appears too accommodative to US desires, then popular demands for the removal of US troops could rise in Korea.

The development of the present-day Korean nation has made the traditional ROK/US military relationship an anachronism. This relationship must adjust to the existence of Korean sovereignty if they are to survive in the near future. This adjustment is inevitable in the face of the Korean nation's emergent capability and desire to exercise control over their own destiny.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS

This study eventually reveals problem areas of the current ROK-US military command relationship: 1) The current command relationship is unacceptable because the complex structure makes it inefficient to wage war. 2) The current command relationship is also unacceptable because it offends Korean sovereignty.

The evident inequity in the ROK/US military command relationship is the day to day OPCON of ROK military forces by a US senior officer in the ROK, and lack of a ROK CINC. Considering that the principle and spirit of US foreign policy is based on the total respect of another nation's sovereignty, US OPCON over ROK forces is entirely contrary to the principle.

The ROK nation, its government and armed forces have outgrown the ROK-US military relationship created by the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. The current situation is totally different from that of the post-Korean War. The post-war situation in South Korea was that of a devastated country. The cities lay in rubble. The

factories were in shambles. Millions of Korean people wandered the streets homeless and hungry. History will long record the Korean story; how in less than a generation the Koreans stepped into the light of liberty and economic opportunity. The Koreans demonstrated their potential through the peaceful transfer of political leadership in 1988. And never before has the pride and the progress of the Republic of Korea been more evident than the summer of 1988, when Korea played host to the 24th Olympic Games. (1) The maturity of the nation requires that the ROK-US military relationship be redefined on a co-equal basis rather than one of dependence.

Considering that we cannot expect the US to keep its forces in Korea indefinitely and that at least the US ground forces will be pulled out in the future, the US will not be able to continue to retain OPCON over ROK forces. How to respond to the new political and military environment on the peninsula thus becomes an important priority for the ROK government and military authority. The future military coordination between the ROK and the US will not be achieved without the development and establishment of ROK military independent command systems. To deter future military conflict on the Korean peninsula requires the ROK to develop its own peculiar command system. The reasons are as follows: 1) The current command structure is not appropriate

to meet the expected demands of future war. 2) The distinct separation between regular war and guerrilla warfare on the Korean Peninsula is not possible. 3) From the point of view of the Korean people, the expected nature of war will be national civil war, not an international conflict. and 4) The current complex CFC command structure will not be effective in meeting this eventuality.

A blueprint for US force withdrawal must be developed in coordination with the ROK government. Without understanding US future intentions, the ROK will not expect to counter contingency situations in the meantime. To actively begin planning for US force withdrawal is a potentially destabilizing project in view of the US global strategy and its Far Eastern military strategy, specifically with reference to Korea. But this plan is a necessary criteria before the ROK government can begin the task of the military restructure of the ROK command system.

The establishment of an effective, modern intelligence system is critical to the establishment of the independence of the command system. The command system will not be established without it. Continued dependence on the US intelligence system against North Korean military areas will never enable ROK military independence to occur.

In the past, the ROK government did not have a national agency to integrate and analyze areas of national security interest. The ROK did not worry about that function, content to allow the UNC or the USFK to remain responsible for the role. The national security policy decision system must be revitalized in conjunction with taking over OPCON of ROK military forces. The imminent independence of ROK military authority requires a fully mature national policy decision system, to include national security, military policy or strategy, and weapon system development. Military affairs decision making must be a function of coordinating processing of military and political assessments. The ROK/US military negotiations must result in the ROK assumption of full political responsibility. A result of ROK/US military coordination in the future will be reinforcement, not abrogation of the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty. The ROK/US Security Consultative Meeting is a solely military level institutional apparatus. It should include political level participation, i.e. ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and US Secretary of State, since the military situation on the Korean peninsula is significantly intermingled with the political situation.

A salient characteristic of the North-South Korean military imbalance is the imbalance of command authority

held by both sides, not a military power imbalance, or strategic imbalance. North Korea has exercised sole authority over their armed forces since they established the DPRK People's Army in 1948. In contrast, the ROK armed forces has been placed under OPCON of the US forces in South Korea since 1950. As discussed earlier, the vulnerability of the pre-Korean War ROK command system was exemplified in the initial stage of the Korean War. A new operational command system will not become mature overnight, much like the development of warfighting capabilities through training. This is one of the most serious problem areas facing the ROK military. Kim Il Sung clearly seems to recognize this vulnerability of the South Korean forces. He insists that South Korea cannot sign a non-aggression agreement with North Korea due to the fact that South Korea does not have command authority over their own forces. Subsequently, the ROK government will have to be able to develop a command system comparable to the North Korean military example. This example is derived from the following areas; 1) North Korean Army is clearly the military arm of the North Korean Communist Party, 2) Kim Il Sung is Supreme Commander. A revised ROK military command should reflect similar characteristics with the important exception that the south Korean people exercise supreme command over its military through its democratically elected government.

Return of US OPCON over the ROK forces will eventually imply a revision of US military strategy in the Far East. The US action will fully recognize the ROK military maturity. This transfer will also exemplify the strong US confidence in the South Korean military and its ability to reduce the military tension on the Korean peninsula through direct negotiations with North Korea.

The transition to an acceptable command relationship must be carried out in stages as follows:

- 1) Eliminating the inequity in the ROK/US military command relationship by reevaluating the ROK/US Mutual Defense Treaty is the first step. It should reflect a command structure (CFC) to which both countries, with compliance of national leaders, will make forces available if North Korea attacks.

- 2) Return of ROK forces OPCON to the ROK National Command Authority is the second step. Additionally, this means return of OPCON of all forces to their respective governments. There would be no forces (ROK/US) OPCON to CFC until activation of the theater. CFC becomes a wartime command on the NATO model. The ROK and the US need to work out a mutually acceptable rotation for primary command positions.

- 3) As a third step, create a new command structure with a


ROK General as its first CINC. Command on a rotational basis would be most equitable. Contrary to US tradition of having a US Commander in charge of all US forces, command structure in wartime is required that combined component commanders of CFC be inevitable. The reasons are as follows: a) Air Force plays a much more significant part now especially due to Air Land/Sea Battle Doctrine. b) Korea is surrounded by the sea. c) Two from Air Force and Navy out of three component commands are controlled by US. d) ROK Commanders know the ground better. CFA makes no sense once ROK forces return to ROK control. It simply would be abolished. The ROK government will determine the need to implement the treaty including discussion of the transition from low intensity conflict to mid/high intensity conflicts.

4) Next, disestablish UNC HQ. Korea has outgrown it.

5) Finally, a bilateral agreement between South and North must be negotiated to replace the 1953 Armistice. After this, the UNC and the Military Armistice Commission disappear.

A model of a new developed ROK/US military command structure is as follows:

PROPOSED PEACETIME COMMAND STRUCTURE



OPTION 1

- By treaty agreement CINC rotates every 2 years between ROKA Mil Cmd and CDR USFK same with Dep.

OPTION 2

- Have separate CINC CDR and staff who do nothing else.

Recommend: Option 1 - it shows each country's commitment to the treaty agreement.

WARTIME COMMAND STRUCTURE




Figure 6-1. Proposed Peace and Wartime Command Structure.

In summary, strategies of the ROK/US are basically unchanged. The ROK nation, its government and armed forces have outgrown the ROK/US relationship created by the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953. The maturity of the ROK nation requires that this relationship be redefined on a co-equal basis rather than one of dependence. This redefined relationship will yield two outcomes significantly important to both nations: 1) The ROK Government will assume its rightful share of its own national security burden for the first time since the turn of the century. 2) Through establishment of a new bilateral basis for negotiations between North and South, for the first time since 1953, the conditions will be created for true progress in easing tensions on the peninsula.

Return of US OPCON over ROK forces to the ROK Government will eventually contribute to silencing South Korean militant students, anti-government demonstrators and especially North Korean authorities since the ROK government would be able to convince them of the fact that the ROK government is an independent, legitimate government exercising sole command authority over its forces. This agreement by the ROK and US administrations will finally provide visible elimination of negative-sentiment on both governments. In addition, this action will symbolically lead the ROK military to totally dedicate themselves to

their duty. It is high time for ROK Armed Forces, especially, their officer corps, to attempt to internally conduct a revolutionary innovation in the military for the purpose of struggling to identify themselves in the divided nation. North Korea will finally deal face to face with South Korea, free of outside interference, to settle differences and create the framework for reunification. What this means to all concerned is peace in Northeast Asia and the creation of a regional environment of mutual respect and cooperation, where all nations can realize their national potential.

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GLOSSARY

ACC	Air Force Component Command
CAF	Combined Aviation Forces
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
CFA	Combined Field Army (ROK/US)
CFC	ROK-US Combined Forces Command
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CNFK	Commander, Naval Forces in Korea
CUWTF	Combined Unconventional Task Forces
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EUSA	Eighth US Army
FECOM	Far East Command
FROKA	First Republic of Korea Army
GCC	Ground Component Command
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to the United States Army
KMAG	Korea Military Advisoray Group
MAC	Military Armistice Commission
MCM	Military Council Meeting
MND	Ministry of National Defense
NCA	National Command Authority
NCC	Naval Component Command
NK	North Korea
NKPA	North Korea People's Army

NSC	National Security Council
OPCON	Operational Control
PACOM	Pacific Command
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
RS&D	Reception, Supply, and Deployment
SCM	ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting
TS EX	Team Spirit Exercise
TROKA	Third Republic of Korea Army
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNRC	United Nations Reception Center
USFK	United States Forces in Korea

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